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I. Introduction 
Privatization of the criminal justice system1 has taken a danger-
ous new form that threatens important equality interests entrusted to 
the impartiality of the government prosecutor. Government prosecu-
tors have begun accepting, and in some cases soliciting, voluntary con-
tributions from the private sector in order to pay the costs of certain 
types of criminal prosecutions. Such private :financing of criminal 
prosecutions has taken place within the last few years in California, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina.2 The source of the money 
is typically that segment of the business community most affected by 
the crimes to be prosecuted. 
Private :financing of a government prosecution in a criminal case 
frames a unique set of questions about what role equality should play 
in a prosecutor's decisions.3 Should a prosecutor be able to consider 
1. Privatization in the United States usually means "enlisting private energies to im-
prove the performance of tasks that would remain in some sense public." JOHN D. DONA-
HUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION 6-7 (1989). While private financing of government 
criminal prosecutions is relatively new, the privatization of other parts of the criminal jus-
tice system has been a subject of great interest for some time. For analysis of privatization 
of law enforcement, correctional institutions, and the judiciary, see PRIVATIZING THE 
UNITED STATES JumCE SYSTEM (Gary W. Bowman et al. eds., 1992). For a discussion of 
constitutional aspects of the privatization of corrections, see Ira P. Robbins, The Impact of 
the Delegation Doctrine on Prison Privatization, 35 UCLA L. REv. 911 (1988). For a theo-
retical analysis of privatization in general, see Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: Politics, Laws, 
and Theory, 71 MARo. L. REv. 449 (1988). 
2. See infra notes 6-10 and accompanying text. 
3. Private financing differs from the use of private prosecutors in criminal cases, a 
practice that has a long history in the United States and that still exists in a number of 
jurisdictions. Private prosecution involves a private party filing a criminal complaint 
against another private party and hiring private counsel to prosecute that complaint. Pri-
vate financing, on the other hand, involves a private party financing all or part of a criminal 
action brought by the government against another private person. Private financing, un-
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the willingness of a victim to finance a prosecution in choosing which 
cases to prosecute or to what extent a case should be prosecuted? 
Would such victims enjoy preferential access to justice? By expanding 
the resources available to a government prosecutor on a selective ba-
sis, private financing introduces a new tension into prosecutorial deci-
sionmaking: Society's interest in punishing the guilty must compete 
with society's interest in equal treatment by government. 
In allocating their limited time and resources, prosecutors choose 
which crimes to prosecute based on the type of crime, the nature of 
the victim, and the nature of the potential defendants. Prosecutors 
are expected to be guided in these choices by the "public interest,"4 
but embedded in the prosecutor's conception of the public interest are 
trade-offs among competing public goods and competing private inter-
ests. Is it more in the public interest to prosecute insurance fraud or 
environmental crime? To prosecute fraud committed against busi-
nesses or against consumers? To invest heavily in a single death pen-
alty prosecution or to spread the same investment of time and money 
over all crimes of violence? Currently, such choices are entrusted to 
the sole discretion of the prosecutor. Private financing raises the 
question of whether taking voluntary contributions from victims or 
other private groups creates a conflict of interest-a conflict between 
the prosecutor's obligation to be impartial in making these choices 
and the prosecutor's institutional interest in the monies received. 
Private financing of criminal prosecutions also raises the question 
of whether institutions, as opposed to people, can be biased by money. 
Prosecutorial conflict of interest typically involves a prosecutor who 
has some personal interest-sometimes pecuniary-in the prosecution 
of a given criminal case. A paradigm example is the prosecutor who 
prosecutes a defendant in a criminal case and simultaneously repre-
sents the victim of the crime in a civil suit against the same defendant.5 
Private financing arguably involves no such personal interest because 
like private prosecution, raises questions about the capture by private interests of the gov-
ernment's considerable law enforcement powers. See infra notes 160-63 and accompanying 
text. For a constitutional analysis of private prosecution that includes a complete bibliog-
raphy of authorities and commentary, see John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the 
Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REv. 511 (1994). 
4. See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 395 n.5 (1987) ("[T]he constituency 
of an elected prosecutor is the public, and such a prosecutor is likely to be influenced 
primarily by the general public interest."); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249 
(1980) ("Prosecutors ... must serve the public interest."); see also Bessler, supra note 3, at 
561 n.214 and authorities cited therein. 
5. See examples cited infra note 57. 
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the money does not flow directly into the pockets of any individual 
prosecutor-instead, it flows into the coffers of the prosecutor's office. 
Private :financing has taken a number of different forms. In Cali-
fornia's Silicon Valley, a district attorney prosecuting a trade secret 
case allowed the victim corporation to pay more than $13,000 for in-
dependent expert investigators and was recused by the trial judge, 
who found that receipt of the funds created a conflict of interest.6 Lo-
cal businesses in California's Ventura County voluntarily contributed 
$150,000 to a fund used by the district attorney to prosecute workers' 
compensation fraud, a fund that has operated with the California At-
torney General's blessing.7 In Portland, Oregon, local businesses have 
funded the salary and office expenses of a "neighborhood district at-
torney."8 In Philadelphia, the district attorney established a nonprofit 
corporation for the purpose of accepting private contributions for a 
variety of purposes, which include :financing certain prosecutions.9 In 
an unusual case not involving contributions from business interests, a 
number of people from all parts of the country sent donations to help 
finance the costs of the prosecution against Susan Smith for the mur-
der of her two sons after the media reported that the rural South Car-
olina county might not be able to afford the expense of a death 
penalty prosecution.10 
The trend toward private :financing is driven in part by chronic 
fiscal pressures. Prosecutors at all levels of government face budget 
6. In affinning the recusal, the California Supreme Court noted that the issue was 
one of first impression and held that "such financial assistance to the prosecutor's office 
may indeed disqualify the district attorney from acting further in a case, if the assistance is 
of such character and magnitude 'as to render in unlikely that defendant will receive fair 
treatment during all portions of the criminal proceeding."' People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 
310, 312 (Cal. 1996) (quoting People v. Conner, 666 P .2d 5, 9 (Cal. 1983)). The court 
upheld the recusal based on a California statute establishing grounds for disqualification of 
a prosecutor. See id at 316-19. 
7. See Jeff McDonald, Private Funds OKd for Use in Prosecutions, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 
28, 1993, at Bl; see also Paul Elias, D.A. Inches Ahead in War on Insurance Fraud; Work-
ers' Comp: Privately Funded Unit that Investigates and Prosecutes Suspected Cheaters Has 
Registered Mixed Results and Steady Criticism from Defense Attorneys, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 
19, 1996, at Bl. 
8. Telephone Interview with Wayne Pearson, Deputy District Attorney, Multnomah 
County, Or. (Aug. 5, 1995). 
9. Telephone Interview with Al Toczydlowski, Deputy District Attorney, City of Phil-
adelphia, Pa. (Dec. 9, 1996). 
10. See Al Dozier, Judge: Use of Private Funds OK, THE HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), 
Jan. 26, 1995, at 4A. The case achieved national notoriety because Smith initially claimed 
that an unidentified African-American male kidnapped her two sons, and she pleaded for 
their safe return on national television. Smith subsequently confessed to drowning the 
children herself. See Jim Clarke, Smith Held Without Bail in Death of Her Sons, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 6, 1994, at A-22. 
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cutbacks at the same time that public concern about crime is at an all-
time high.11 Truces, the traditional means of financing government 
prosecutions, are seen as politically unpopular.12 Allowing some sort 
of private financial contribution arguably helps to close the gap be-
tween supply and demand for the prosecution of crime. 
Private financing may also be seen as a way to make government 
more efficient in prosecuting crime.13 Partnering public with private 
dollars is an increasingly popular form of "reinventing government," 
through which public resources are directed toward the problems that 
concern society most.14 In some cases, private financing could be seen 
as a "user's fee" for those victims of crime who wish to use the crimi-
nal justice system.15 
However, private financing is driven by more than just monetary 
concerns. Private financing taps into powerful pressures for a greater 
involvement of the victim in the criminal justice system. A view exists 
that both society's interest in punishment and the individual interests 
of the victim lose out to the interests of the criminal justice system's 
repeat players-the judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel who 
deal with one another on a daily basis.16 Some believe that only 
through greater participation of the victim in the charging and disposi-
11. See, e.g., THE REAL WAR ON CruME: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CruM!NAL Jus-
TICE COMMISSION 1 (Steven A. Donziger ed., 1996) (arguing that $100 billion yearly ex-
penditures on crime control demonstrate an obsession with crime); Andrew Blum, 
Prosecutors Say Money Squeeze Pinches Justice; Crime Bill Bottleneck, NAT'L LJ., Jan. 30, 
1995, at Al 
12. '" All of our public-opinion polls indicate that when you confront citizens with 
their preference for raising revenue-user fees, property tax, local sales tax, local income 
tax-user fees win hands down."' DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING Gov-
ERNMENT: How THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PuBLIC SECTOR 
203 (1992) (quoting John Shannon, former Executive Director of the Advisory Commis-
sion on Intergovernmental Relations in Washington, D.C.). 
13. "In recent years, the 'public choice' movement has held that government agencies 
will be more responsive and efficient if they can be compelled to react to marketlike 
forces." DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: UNDERSTANDING MANAGE-
MENT, PoLmCS, AND LAW IN THE PuBLIC SECTOR 9-10 (1993). 
14. See OSBORNE & GAEBLER, supra note 12, at 203-04. 
15. "Both user charges and fees attempt to relieve burdel}.s placed on the general-
revenue system by extracting greater contribution from service beneficiaries .••• " JoHN L. 
MIKESELL, FISCAL ADMINISTRATION: ANALYSIS AND APPLICATIONS FOR THE PuBLIC SEC-
TOR 422 (1995). 
16. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, WITII JUSTICE FOR SoME: VICTIMS' RIGHrS IN 
CruM!NAL TRIALS (1995); Lois G. FoRER, A RAGE To PuNIStt: THE UNINTENDED CoNsE-
QUENCES OF MANDATORY SENTENCING (1994); Juan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the 
Prosecutorial Process, 9 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 357,390 (1986) ("Recognizing the crime 
victim's privity of interest in exacting justice for the harm committed ought to be a priority 
of the criminal justice system."). But see, e.g., Stephen Schulhofer, The Trouble with Tri-
als; the Trouble with Us, 105 YALE L.J. 825, 828 (1995) (book review). 
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tion of crimes will criminals get their just deserts and victims their 
recompense due.17 From this latter perspective, private :financing 
could be seen as a means both of squeezing more punishment out of a 
criminal justice system in which institutional players are too often will- • 
ing to compromise and of shaping the course of the prosecution in a 
manner beneficial to the victim. 
The thesis of this Article is that private :financing serves economic 
efficiency and the interests of victims selectively, at best, and inevita-
bly at the expense of equality interests whose importance has not been 
appreciated fully. Private :financing in any of its likely forms threatens 
equality of treatment by potentially biasing the prosecutor in favor of 
the contributors. Such a practice sacrifices the equality of the prose-
cutor's choices in order to enlist the :financial support of victims who 
have both a direct interest in the prosecution and the money to fur-
ther that interest. Ultimately, the overall benefit of that support to 
society does not justify the damage done to the legitimacy of govern-
ment prosecutions. 
Part II describes how the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion en-
trusts the prosecutor to make decisions implicating important equality 
interests and argues that conflict-of-interest rules play a key role in 
protecting those interests. A division of labor operates in how liberty 
and equality interests are protected in the criminal justice process. 
The threat to liberty interests posed by the overzealous prosecutor 
whose commitment to obtaining a prosecution has overwhelmed her 
commitment to the truth is regulated by judicial review of the prose-
cutor's actions on a case-by-case basis. The threat to equality interests 
posed by the partisan prosecutor who favors private interests in her 
decisionmaking process is regulated in an entirely different fashion. 
Owing to the inherently discretionary nature of prosecutorial deci-
sionmaking, judicial review of a prosecutor's actions in any individual 
case cannot detect such favoritism. Instead, a set of prophylactic rules 
shields the government prosecutor from undue influence by any pri-
vate interest. These rules define as a conflict of interest any practice 
that threatens to impair the prosecutor's disinterestedness. 
17. See, e.g., Peter L. Davis, The Crime Victim's "Right" to a Criminal Prosecution: A 
Proposed Model Statute for the Governance of Private Criminal Prosecutions, 38 DEPAUL 
L. REv. 329 (1989); Josephine Gittler, Expanding the Role of the Victim in a Criminal Ac-
tion: An Overview of Issues and Problems, 11 PEPP. L. REv.117 (1984); Abraham S. Gold-
stein, Defining the Role of the Victim in Criminal Prosecution, 52 MISS. L.J. 515 (1982); 
Stuart P. Green, Note, Private Challenges to Prosecutorial Inaction: A Model Declaratory 
Judgment Statute, 97 YALE LJ. 488 (1988). But see, e.g., Donald J. Hall, Victims' Voices in 
Criminal Court: The Need for Restraint, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 233 (1991). 
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Part m argues that private financing creates such a conflict of 
interest. Three cases are analyzed in which the Supreme Court has 
considered how revenue flows can threaten institutional impartiality, 
and various forms of private financing are evaluated in terms of that 
analysis. 
Part IV evaluates the economic efficiency and victims' rights ar-
guments in favor of private financing and discusses the equality inter-
ests threatened in terms of legitimacy, preferential access to justice, 
and the capture of public power by private interests. 
II. The Meaning of an Impartial Prosecutor in an 
Adversary System 
What is the proper relationship between the prosecutor and the 
victims of crime in our society? This question takes on special signifi-
cance when there is a direct flow of money from victims to govern-
ment prosecutors. 
The paradox of the "impartial prosecutor" has haunted past ef-
forts to explore the relationship between prosecutors and crime vic-
tims. Prosecutors are often described as being in some sense 
impartial.18 Yet, as a participant in an adversary system, the govern-
ment prosecutor is expected to be a zealous advocate.19 Since the 
judge in our system of justice occupies a neutral as opposed to accusa-
torial role, the prosecutor alone must advocate zealously the state's 
interest in convicting and punishing the guilty. In such a context, "im-
partial prosecutor" seems to be a contradiction in terms. 
The following subpart resolves this tension in the prosecutor's 
role20 by arguing that equality interests and liberty interests are pro-
18. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172 (1951) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that an impartial prosecutor generates the important 
feeling that justice has been done); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("The 
United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but 
of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to 
govern at all."); Jones v. Richards, 776 F.2d 1244, 1247 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that a crimi-
nal defendant is entitled "to an impartial prosecutor, who can make an unbiased use of all 
options available"); People v. Eubanks, 927 P .2d 310, 315 (Cal. 1996) ("The nature of the 
impartiality required of the public prosecutor follows from the prosecutor's role as a 
respresentative of the People as a body, rather than as individuals."); MooEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 3.8 cmt.1 (1995) ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a 
minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate."). 
19. See Berger, 295 U.S. at 88 (stating that the public prosecutor should prosecute 
"with earnestness and vigor"). 
20. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 25 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (holding the prosecutor to a higher standard of behavior than de-
fense counsel); MODEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPoNsran.ITY EC 7-13 (1982) ("The 
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tected in the criminal justice system in different ways. The remaining 
subparts support that argument by describing the inherently discre-
tionary nature of prosecutorial decisionmaking and the limited judi-
cial review of those decisions, and by analyzing the Supreme Court's 
leading case on prosecutorial conflicts of interest. 
A. The Paradox Resolved: Different Protections for Different 
Interests 
Confusion about the prosecutor's role has its source in a failure to 
distinguish between two different types of impartiality. First, govern-
ment prosecutors are expected to be impartial in the sense that they 
are required to seek the truth and not merely to obtain convictions.21 
For example, a prosecutor who fails to disclose exculpatory material 
to the defense violates the defendant's right to an impartial prosecutor 
because it is less likely that the jury will arrive at the truth.22 Such acts 
of partiality by prosecutors are often described as "over-
zealousness. "23 
responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to 
seek justice, not merely to convict."); CHARLES W. WOI.FRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS, 
§ 13.10.1, at 759 (1986) ("They are the only governmental officers responsible for obtaining 
convictions of the guilty in litigated criminal cases; but they also bear alone the state's 
considerable responsibility to see that no innocent person is prosecuted, convicted, or pun-
ished."}; Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 B.Y.U. 
L. R:Ev. 669, 698 (1992); Dirk G. Christensen, Comment, Incentives vs. Nonpartisanship: 
The Prosecutorial Dilemma in an Adversary System, 1981 DUKE LJ. 311 (1981}; see also 
W.J. Michael Cody, Special Ethical Duties for Attorneys Who Hold Public Positions, 23 
MEM. ST. U. L. R:Ev., 453, 456 (1993); Carol A. Corrigan, On Prosecutorial Ethics, 13 
liAsTINGS CoNST. L.Q. 537, 537-38 (1986). 
21. See MODEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmILITY EC 7-13 (1982) ("[H]is duty 
is to seek justice, ·not merely to convict."); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 3-
1.1 crnt. (1979) ("[I]t is fundamental that the prosecutor's obligation is to protect the inno-
cent as well as convict the guilty, to guard the rights of the accused as well as to enforce the 
rights of the public."); see also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 648-49 (1974) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The function of the prosecutor under the Federal Constitution is 
not to tack as many skins of victims as possible to the wall."}, cited in Bessler, supra note 3, 
at 545 n.135. 
22. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (prosecutor must disclose to 
defense evidence that would be sufficient to undermine confidence in outcome of proceed-
ing); Brady v: Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor cannot suppress material evidence 
favorable to accused); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1982} 
("[A] prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence merely because he be-
lieves it will damage the prosecutor's case or aid the accused."). For a discussion of the 
prosecutor's due process obligations of disclosure, see Terrence Galligan, The Prosecutor's 
Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence After United States v. Bagley, 1 GEo. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 213 (1987). 
23. One commentator has proposed a system of personal financial incentives to dis-
courage overzealous prosecutors. Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: lnfluenc-
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Prosecutors are not, however, expected to be impartial as to the 
guilt or innocence of the defendant. While prosecutors are, in theory, 
zealous advocates for the truth, they develop a conception of what the 
truth is in particular cases and then become wedded to that concep-
tion. Embedded in the structure of the criminal justice system is a 
recognition that the prosecutor's partiality to that conception of truth 
can threaten the liberty interests of the accused. The process of judi-
cial review, which begins once the charge is filed in court, guards 
against any "overzealousness" resulting from the prosecutor's belief in 
the guilt of the accused. Indeed, the entire procedural process of 
criminal cases can be seen as one continuing safeguard of the various 
liberty interests vulnerable to the overzealous prosecutor.24 
The second, distinct sense in which prosecutors are expected to 
be impartial is that they are not supposed to discriminate for or 
against any particular group in deciding which cases to prosecute.25 
One aspect of this obligation is that prosecutors are not supposed to 
favor improperly one complaining party over another. Instead, it is 
expected that all victims will receive equal consideration vis-a-vis one 
another.26 For example, a wealthy victim of an assault and a poor 
victim of the same crime should enjoy an equal claim upon the prose-
cutor's time and energies. A corollary expectation is that a prosecutor 
will not target a person for prosecution on invidious grounds.27 This 
second type of impartiality has been described as 
"disinterestedness. "28 
ing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. RE.v. 
851 (1995). 
24. See, e.g., United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (prosecutor must cure 
false testimony by disclosure); Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (prosecutor cannot pres-
ent false evidence); United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 759 (2d Cir. 1983) (prosecutor 
has obligation of fairness in presenting a case to grand jury); MooEL RULES OF PRoFES-
SIONAL CoNDucr Rule 3.8(b) (1995) (Prosecutor must "make reasonable efforts to assure 
that the accused has been advised of the right to, and the procedure for obtaining, counsel 
and has been given reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel."); id at Rule 3.8(c) (Prosecu-
tor must "not seek to obtain from an unrepresented accused a waiver of important pretrial 
rights, such as the right to a preliminary hearing."). 
25. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (holding that discriminatorily selec-
tive enforcement bars prosecution regardless of guilt of accused). 
26. Cf. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 400 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (prosecutors cannot put private interest before the public interest); Berger, 295 U.S. 
M~ . 
27. See Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). 
28. Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Flis S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 804 (1987); Wright 
v. United States, 732 F.2d 1048, 1056 (2d Cir. 1984) ("It is a bit easier to say what a disin-
terested prosecutor is not than what he is. He is not disinterested if he has, or is under the 
influence of others who have, an axe to grind against the defendant, as distinguished from 
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The criminal justice system is not structured to protect against 
partiality of the prosecutor to some private interest because the prose-
cutor's decisions about whom to prosecute and to what extent to pros-
ecute are not subject to meaningful judicial review.29 For this reason, 
conflict-of-interest rules preclude direct ties between a criminal prose-
cutor and the private interests affected by her charging decisions. 
Thus, while it is assumed that the prosecutor will become partial to 
the version of reality she constructs during the charging process, con-
flict-of-interest rules attempt to keep the prosecutor as free from in-
fluence as possible during her construction of that version of reality 
and throughout the subsequent exercise of her discretion. 
B. Equality and the Inherently Discretionary Nature of Prosecutorial 
Decisionmaking 
While the liberty interest at stake in any particular prosecution 
resides, for the most part, in a particular defendant, the equality inter-
est is more diffuse. For each criminal accusation filed by the govern-
ment, a number of chargeable cases were not filed because of limited 
prosecutorial resources. The equality interest implicated in each crim-
inal ca~e charged is shared among all of the crime victims whose cases 
could potentially have been charged. Their interests in vindication in-
evitably compete against one another as the prosecutor allocates her 
limited time and resources. Favoring one victim over another as a re-
sult of personal influence violates the other victims' equality 
interests.30 
the appropriate interest that members of society have in bringing a defendant to justice 
with respect to the crime with which he is charged."). 
29. See JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PRosECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 3 
(1980) ("The American prosecutor enjoys an independence and discretionary privileges 
unmatched in the world."); Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Prrr. L. 
REv. 393, 394 (1992) (arguing that the vast accretion of prosecutorial power has trans-
formed the criminal justice system by skewing power in favor of the state); Robert G. 
Morvillo & Barry A. Bohrer, Checking the Balance: Prosecutorial Power in an Age of Ex-
pansive Litigation, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 137, 137 (1995) (arguing that increased penalties 
and mandatory sentences have given federal prosecutors "greater leverage to virtually 
compel plea bargaining, force cooperation, and in essence determine the length of 
sentences"); Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 
135 U. PA. L. REv. 1365, 1365 (1987) ("[C]ontemporary efforts to constrain the discretion 
of actors in the criminal justice system have not only bypassed the prosecutor, they have 
tended to expand her power by squeezing the system's seemingly insoluble bubble of dis-
cretion her way.") (footnotes omitted). 
30. The defendant also shares in this equality interest to some degree. Defendants 
have a right not to be selectively prosecuted on invidious grounds. See Oyler, 368 U.S. at 
456. Private financing raises interesting questions about the extent of this equality interest. 
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Any criminal case brought by the government is the product of a 
multidimensional selection process. In a society with sweeping laws 
and finite resources for enforcement, prosecutors decide which types 
of crimes to prosecute and which to ignore.31 Some commentators 
have criticized prevailing prosecutorial policies for emphasizing prop-
erty and drug crimes over so-called "white collar" crimes.32 Yet se-
lecting enforcement priorities is essential in a society where not all 
crimes are truly considered equal in terms of their impact on the pub-
lic interest. 
A different perspective on charging emphasizes that prosecutors 
decide who gets prosecuted and who does not. At one level, this is a 
function of the types of crimes that prosecutors target for enforce-
ment. A drug enforcement policy focusing on street sales of inexpen-
sive "crack" cocaine in economically depressed areas rather than 
"suite sales" of cocaine in its more expensive powder form has had the 
demonstrable effect of targeting poor people of color.33 Some see 
these effects as incidental and others do not. 34 
However, the prosecutor's selection of who gets prosecuted may 
lead to unequal results on another, more fundamental level. If the 
police arrest two people for the same crime based on evidence of 
equal strength, a prosecutor has complete discretion to prosecute one 
and "discharge" the other.35 This more explicit type of selectivity is a 
function of the many factors that prosecutors are generally expected 
to consider in making the charging decision. The National District 
Is equality offended if a defendant faces a more effective prosecution on account of the 
wealth of her victim? See infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text. 
31. "The prosecutor commonly and normally screens potential violations and selects 
those which he feels most warrant investigation and prosecution. Such discretional action 
is induced by lack of investigative and prosecutorial resources, by legislative overgeneral-
ization, and by low enforcement priority of some violations." NATIONAL DISTRICT ArroR-
NEYS Ass'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 128 (1977) (commentary to Chapter 8) 
[hereinafter NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS]. 
32. See, e.g., Michael L. Benson et al., Community Context and the Prosecution of Cor-
porate Crime, in WHITE-CoLLAR CRIME RECONSIDERED 269 (Kip Schlegel & David Weis-
burd eds., 1992). 
33. In his dissenting opinion in United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1493 
(1996), Justice Stevens noted that 88% of federal offenders convicted for trafficking in 
crack were African-American even though the majority of crack users are white. 
34. See Lisa Stansky, Crack vs. Cocaine, CAL. LAW., Feb. 1996, at 19-20. 
35. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); NATIONAL PROSECUTION 
STANDARDS, supra note 31, at Standard 9.3 ("The prosecutor is not obligated to file all 
possible charges which available evidence might support. The prosecutor may properly 
exercise his discretion to present only those charges which he considers to be consistent 
with the best interests of justice."). 
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Attorneys Association lists the following factors as among this rele-
vant to the charging decision: 
1. The nature of the offense; 
2. The characteristics of the offender; 
3. The age of the offense; 
4. The interests of the victim; 
5. Possible improper motives of a victim or witness; 
6. A history of non-enforcement of a statute; 
7. Likelihood of prosecution by another criminal justice 
authority; 
9. Aid to other prosecuting goals through non-prosecution; 
10. Possible deterrent value of prosecution; 
11. Undue hardship caused to the accused; 
12. Excessive cost of prosecution in relation to the seriousness 
of the offense; 
13. The probability of conviction; 
14. Recommendations of the involved law enforcement 
agency; and 
15. Any mitigating circumstances.36 
Toe relationship between these factors is fluid: "In a given case, any 
one or combination of these illustrative factors may be a basis for re-
jecting a case."37 
A decision involving so many factors is inherently discretionary in 
the sense that "it cannot be reduced to a predictable formula."38 Toe 
decision always seems to depend on the facts of the case in a way that 
resists abstract standards. For example, strong evidence of a noctur-
nal trespass by a person with a long history of burglaries may seem 
less charge-worthy if one envisions a seventy-five year old, terminally 
ill defendant. Meanwhile, equally solid evidence of a nocturnal tres-
pass by a person with no prior criminal record and a long history of 
community service may seem more charge-worthy if one learns that 
the suspect is a campaign worker caught in the headquarters of a 
political rival. Context is everything in charging decisions.39 
36. NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 31, at Standard 9.3 (factor 8 
omitted in original). Clearly the fact that prosecutors are forced to consider the cost of a 
prosecution under the current regime is the single most compelling argument for consider-
ing the use of private financing. In an ideal world, the prosecutor would be free to select 
crimes for prosecution based solely on the remaining factors. 
37. David C. James, The Prosecutor's Discretionary Screening and Charging Authority, 
PROSECUTOR, Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 26 (discussing different charging models in use by 
prosecutors). 
38. Id. at 22. 
39. A prosecutor can also affect, both formally and informally, the investigation pro-
cess that precedes the filing of a charge. See James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of 
Prosecutorial Power, 94 HAR.v. L. REv. 1521, 1536-37 (1981). 
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C. The Limited Nature of Judicial Review of Prosecutorial 
Decisionmaking 
677 
Prosecutorial decisions about whom to charge are virtually im-
mune from judicial review on constitutional grounds.40 The Supreme 
Court's decisions "uniformly have recognized that courts normally 
must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to whom to prosecute."41 
While a prosecutor must have "probable cause to believe that the ac-
cused committed an offense defined by statute,"42 the de minimis na-
ture of the probable cause standard provides little real restraint on 
prosecutorial decisionmaking. There is only one vehicle for making 
the criminal prosecutor account for her charging decisions before a 
judge-a motion for dismissal based on a claim of selective 
prosecution.43 
To prevail on a selective prosecution claim, the Supreme Court 
requires that a defendant show that the charging decision was "delib-
erately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or 
other arbitrary classification."44 This element of deliberateness re-
quires showing not just a discriminatory effect but also a discrimina-
tory purpose.45 Showing a mere pattern of prosecutions against any 
particular group, for example, is insufficient: "'Discriminatory pur-
pose,' however, implies more than ... intent as awareness of conse-
quences. It implies that the decisionmaker ... selected or reaffirmed 
a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in 
spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."46 In essen-
tially requiring that the defendant prove that the prosecutor charged 
her "because of' an illegal reason, the Court has established a burden 
40. See id. at 1537-43. 
41. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987). 
42. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,364 (1978). 
43. Selective prosecution motions are, by their nature, brought by defendants in cases 
that have been charged. There is no procedural vehicle by which a victim can challenge a 
prosecutor's decision not to charge a case. See Leeke v. Tunmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 86-87 
(1981) (stating that the decision to prosecute is solely within prosecutor's discretion); 
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (stating that a private citizen lacks a 
judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution of another); Dix v. Superior Court, 807 
P.2d 1063 (Cal. 1991) (finding that a crime victim lacked standing to litigate sentencing 
issue as matter of public interest). 
44. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448,456 (1962) (emphasis added}. 
45. See United States v. Wayte, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985); cf. McCieskey v. Kemp, 481 
U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to Georgia's capital punishment 
statute based on a statistical study showing its disproportionate impact on African-
Americans ). 
46. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,279 (1979) (citation omitted}, quoted in 
Wayte, 470 U.S. at 610. 
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of proof that is very difficult to sustain.47 Given the multiplicity of 
factors going into the charging decision, prosecutors can almost al-
ways point to some other reason for charging a case. Proving that a 
single factor served as a "cause" of the decision to prosecute would 
require a virtual admission of discriminatory intent on the part of the 
prosecutorial agency.48 
The complexity of the charging decision and the intangibility of 
the factors involved are the Court's primary justifications for its reluc-
tance to second-guess prosecutorial charging decisions: 
[T]he decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial. 
review. Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecu-
tion's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement 
priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's over-
all enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of 
analysis the courts are competent to undertake.49 
In particular, the Court has emphasized the need for the prosecutor to 
"decide how best to allocate the scarce resources of a criminal justice 
system that simply cannot accommodate the litigation of every serious 
criminal charge. "50 
The Court has also expressed concern that "subjecting the prose-
cutor's motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry" may "chill law 
enforcement."51 Implicit in this concern may be a recognition of the 
political ramifications of charging decisions. Choices among different 
47. See BENNET GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL M1scoNDucr 4-15 to 4-21; 4-32 (1995); 
Vorenberg, supra note 39, at 1542 n.78. 
48. In United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996), the Supreme Court held that 
in order to be entitled to discovery of federal prosecutorial policies, selective prosecution 
claimants must first demonstrate that "federal prosecutorial policy 'had a discriminatory 
effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose."' Id. at 1487 (quoting Wayte, 
470 U.S. at 608). Demonstrating a discriminatory effect required in turn that the claimant 
"show that similarly situated individuals of a different race were not prosecuted." Id. How 
a claimant could ever demonstrate that two potential defendants were similarly situated in 
light of the multitude of factors prosecutors may consider in making charging decisions the 
Court did not say. 
49. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607; see also Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486 ("Judicial deference 
to the decisions of these [federal prosecutors] rests in part on an assessment of the relative 
competence of prosecutors and courts."). 
50. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 396. Prosecutorial discretion does not end once the complaint 
is filed. Perhaps the most important post-charging exercise of discretion is in the area of 
plea bargaining. During the plea bargaining process, prosecutors inevitably balance the 
importance of one case to the public interest against the importance of other cases as a 
consequence of the limits of their own resources. A generous disposition offered on one 
case often reflects the need to focus time and resources on other, more important cases. 
Consequently, prosecutors have complete discretion about what positions to take in plea 
negotiations. See Vorenberg, supra note 39, at 1536-37. 
51. Wayte, 470 U.S. at -607, quoted in Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. at 1486. 
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victims and among potential defendants can directly affect the inter-
ests of various political groups. Each time the prosecutor comes 
before the bench to explain charging policies, she simultaneously 
speaks in a political forum to these different groups. 
Perhaps it is this political dimension of "outside inquiry" into 
prosecutorial motives that the Court finds troubling. The burden of 
proof in the political forum, unlike in the legal forum, is on the prose-
cutor, and in that context the discretionary nature of her decisionmak-
ing process puts her at a disadvantage. Absent a more objective 
decisionmaking process, it would be difficult for a prosecutor to prove 
that a policy that had the effect of singling out certain defendants or 
ignoring certain victims was not intended to be discriminatory.52 
D. Freedom from Conflict of Interest as the Predicate for 
Prosecutorial Discretion 
The prosecutor's freedom of action is supposedly justified by a 
parallel freedom from influence. The prosecutor is trusted to balance 
competing private interests in society because she is not dependent 
upon any discrete private or governmental interest.53 
Prosecutorial independence is safeguarded in a number of differ-
ent ways. First, prosecutors are to different degrees politically ac-
countable to the electorate.54 The chief prosecutor in any office is in 
most cases either an elected official ( as is the case in many counties 
and municipalities) or appointed by an elected official ( as is the case 
with all United States Attorneys, who are appointed by the Presi-
52. In Armstrong, the Supreme Court dusted off the "presumption of regularity" that 
applies to the decisions of federal prosecutors. See 116 S. Ct. at 1486 (" '[I]n the absence of 
clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their 
official duties."') (quoting United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 
(1926)). The Court in Armstrong justified this presumption in terms of the broad discre-
tion afforded prosecutors. See id. 
53. One commentator has argued that this independence mirrors the structure of the 
administrative state as a whole in the United States. See William E. Nelson, Moral Ethics, 
Adversary Justice, and Political Theory: Three Foundations for the Law of Professional Re-
sponsibility, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 911, 926 (1989) (characterizing the administrative 
state as fragmented into a series of independent power centers "to insure that neither the 
bureaucracy as a whole nor any independent unit of it becomes subservient to any single 
social interest"); see also MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE Au-
THORITY: A CoMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROCESS (1986) ( contrasting the hierar-
chical model of continental European bureaucracies against the "coordinate" model of the 
United States, where authority is pushed downward and outward in order to fragment 
government power). 
54. See People ex rel Younger v. Superior Court, 150 Cal. Rptr. 156, 170-71 (a. App. 
1978) (stating that the district attorney may be entrusted with significant discretionary 
powers because he is answerable to the electorate). 
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dent). If that prosecutor subordinates the public interest to some nar-
rower interest, an electoral mechanism for a political response exists.55 
A second safeguard of prosecutorial independence inheres in the 
separation of powers among the branches of government. In this 
sense, the prosecutor is independent from the judiciary and the legis-
lature, and she traditionally enjoys a measure of independence within 
the executive branch as well.56 
Another important safeguard of prosecutorial independence is 
the body of ethical and legal rules that define a conflict of interest as 
any condition under which the prosecutor might be influenced by 
some discrete interest to an intolerable degree.57 These rules protect 
55. To be sure, this electoral mechanism imperfectly protects the public interest. Some 
commentators have criticized the prosecutor's broad immunity from judicial review on the 
grounds that it renders political checks on her discretion meaningless. See, e.g., Vorenberg, 
supra note 39, at 1559 ("The fact that prosecutors or their appointing authorities must seek 
election is small comfort in view of the low visibility with which they exercise their discre-
tion."). Also, money, in the form of campaign contributions, can influence elected prose-
cutors. See, e.g., Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n v. City Council of Los Angeles, 609 P.2d 
1029 (Cal. 1980) (finding that campaign contributions can create conflicts of interest, but 
do not necessarily disqualify an official from acting on matters pertaining to the contribu-
tion). In this context, private financing is not the only avenue of influence over 
prosecutorial decisionmaking for those with money to spend. 
56. See generally Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (discussing separation of 
powers doctrine in the context of a challenge to authority of independent counsel ap-
pointed under the Ethics and Government Act of 1978). 
One commentator has argued that society's interest in the evenhanded treatment of 
all by the government "should be an explicit factor in the analysis of structural issues and 
should provide an animating principle for the jurisprudence of separated powers." Re-
becca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1513, 1516 
(1991). 
57. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (personal interest in litiga-
tion disqualified federal prosecutor); United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(per curiam) (prosecutor cannot have a pecuniary interest in case prosecuted); Ganger v. 
Peyton, 379 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1967) (prosecutor of domestic violence case cannot repre-
sent wife/victim in divorce proceeding for a contingent fee); People ex reL Clancy v. Supe-
rior Court, 705 P.2d 347 (Cal. 1985) (private attorney cannot represent the state as 
prosecutor on a contingency fee basis); Davenport v. State, 278 S.E.2d 440 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1981) (prosecutor who represented victim of domestic violence in divorce against defend-
ant cannot prosecute the criminal case for battery); Commonwealth v. Tabor, 384 N.E.2d 
190 (Mass. 1978) (prosecutor cannot try murder case after representing victim's widow in 
civil case for damages); People v. Basham, 170 N.W.2d 238 (S.D.1969) (prosecutor cannot 
represent victim/family in civil action even if not pending simultaneously). But see Dick v. 
Scroggy, 882 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1989) (prosecutor's subsequent representation of victim in 
civil case did not mandate disqualification); Brooks v. State, 228 So. 2d 24 (Ala. Ct. App. 
1969) (no conflict of interest even though prosecutor represented victim in civil case); Peo-
ple v. Jimenez, 528 P.2d 913 (Colo. 1974) (defendant waived any conflict that might result 
from district attorney prosecuting vehicular homicide and representing victim in civil ac-
tion); Allen v. State, 257 S.E.2d 5 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979} (no conflict in civil representation of 
crime victim by prosecutor). For a discussion of prosecutorial conflicts of interest, see 
Spring 1997] PRIVATE FINANCING OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION 681 
the equality interests implicated by the prosecutor's discretionary 
decisionmaking process by preserving the independence upon which 
that discretion is predicated.58 In Young v. United States ex rel Vuitton 
et Fils S.A.,59 the Supreme Court implicitly recognized the role of con-
flict-of-interest rules in protecting the equality interests that judicial 
review cannot reach in individual cases.60 Vuitton involved a criminal 
contempt action for violation of a civil injunction prohibiting the 
counterfeiting of the plaintiff's product.61 The district court appointed 
the plaintiff's attorneys as special counsel to prosecute the contempt 
against the infringing parties.62 The Supreme Court held that "coun-
sel for a party that is the beneficiary of a court order may not be ap-
pointed to undertake contempt prosecutions for alleged violations of 
that order."63 The Court essentially employed a due process analysis, 
Susan Brenner & James Durham, Towards Resolving Prosecutor Conflicts of Interest, 6 
GEO. J. LEGAL Ennes 415 (1993); Beth Nolan, Removing Conflicts from the Administra-
tion of Justice: Conflicts of Interest and Independent Counsels Under the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act, 79 GEo. LJ. 1 (1990}; Richard H. Underwood, Part-Time Prosecutors and 
Conflicts of Interest: A Survey and Some Proposals, 81 KY. L.J. 1 (1992). For a bibliogra-
phy of ethical codes and federal statutes applicable to prosecutorial conflicts of interest, 
see Bessler, supra note 3, at 546 n.140. 
58. A prosecutor's immunity from civil suit also protects the prosecutor's indepen-
dence. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976) ("The public trust of the prosecu-
tor's office would suffer if he were constrained in making every decision by the 
consequences in terms of his own potential liability in a suit for damages."). 
59. 481 U.S. 787 (1987). For commentary on Vuitton, see Joan Meier, The "Right" to a 
Disinterested Prosecutor of Criminal Contempt: Unpacking Public and Private Interests, 70 
WASH. U. L.Q. 85 (1992}; Terri L. Braswell, Comment, Criminal Procedure-Young v. 
United States ex rel Vuitton et Fils S.A.: The Right to a Disinterested Prosecutor in a Fed-
eral Criminal Contempt Proceeding Arising from the Underlying Civil Litigation., 18 MEM. 
ST. U. L. REv. 143 (1987). 
60. See 481 U.S. at 812-13. 
61. See id. at 789-90. 
62. See id. at 791. 
63. Id. at 790. While a majority agreed that private attorneys should not prosecute 
contempt in such circumstances, it split over whether to reverse the conviction per se or 
whether to remand the case for a harmless-error review. That portion of Justice Brennan's 
opinion that concluded that the error was fundamental and required per se reversal, id. at 
809-14, was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice Powell, joined by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, dissented from Justice Brennan's funda-
mental error analysis and from the judgment as well, arguing that the case should be re-
manded to determine whether the appointment of the private prosecutor was harmless 
error. See id. at 825-27. In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Scalia provided a fifth 
vote for per se reversal on the ground that the appointment of a contempt prosecutor by a 
federal court violates the separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive 
branch. See id. at 815. 
682 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:665 
although it based its holding on the Court's supervisory powers over 
the prosecution of judicial contempt actions.64 
The distinction in Vuitton between liberty and equality interests is 
somewhat inchoate because the Court shifted back and forth between 
different conceptions of prosecutorial impartiality. The Court began 
its analysis by discussing the prosecutor's general obligation to justice 
and truth as follows: 
Toe United States Attorney is the representative not of an 
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obli-
gation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to 
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecu-
tion is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. 
As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of 
the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape 
nor innocence suffer.65 
In pointing out that a private lawyer prosecuting a charge of criminal 
contempt acts in essence as a public prosecutor, however, the Court 
expressed the obligation of impartiality in terms of disinterestedness 
with respect to any particular private party: 
Private attorneys appointed to prosecute a criminal con-
tempt action represent the United States, not the party that is 
the beneficiary of the court order allegedly violated. . . . The 
prosecutor is appointed solely to pursue the public interest in 
vindication of the court's authority. A private attorney ap-
pointed to prosecute a criminal contempt therefore certainly 
should be as disinterested as a public prosecutor who undertakes 
such a prosecution. 66 
This concept of disinterest clearly involved a concern that the prosecu-
tor might further the interests of a private person over the public in-
terest. The Court warned that 
64. Justice Blackmun wrote a concurring opinion arguing that appointing an interested 
party's counsel as prosecutor for a criminal contempt violated the due process requirement 
of "a disinterested prosecutor with the unique responsibility to serve the public, rather 
than a private client, and to seek justice that is unfettered." Id. 
Holdings based on the Court's supervisory authority have sometimes been subse-
quently extended to the states through due process jurisprudence. See, e.g., Bloom v. Illi-
nois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (recognizing a due process right to a jury trial for nonpetty 
contempts); Cheff v. Schackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966) (recognizing under supervisory 
authority the right to jury trial for nonpetty contempts). One commentator has argued 
that Vuitton should be extended to ban all private prosecutions on due process grounds. 
See Bessler, supra note 3, at 571-602. Another commentator has argued that Vuitton 
should not be extended to state courts through due process because private enforcement is 
a key value in the contempt context. See generally Meier, supra note 59. 
65. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (emphasis added), quoted in Vuit-
ton, 481 U.S. at 803. 
66. Vuitton, 481 U.S. at 804 (emphasis added). 
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[a] prosecutor may be tempted to bring a tenuously supported 
prosecution if such a course promises financial or legal rewards 
for the private client. Conversely a prosecutor may be tempted 
to abandon a meritorious prosecution if a settlement providing 
benefits to the private client is conditioned on a recommenda-
tion against criminal charges. 67 
683 
The Court then noted that the appointment of private counsel illus-
trated "the potential for private interest to influence the discharge of 
public duty."68 
Thus far, the Court in Vuitton seems to be primarily concerned 
with the prosecutor's need to be disinterested in the sense of not hav-
ing a bias that would favor any private interest. In acknowledging the 
difference between the standards applicable to a judge and a prosecu-
tor, however, the Court mixed the concept of disinterestedness with 
that of zealousness: "The requirement of a disinterested prosecutor is 
consistent with our recognition that prosecutors may not necessarily 
be held to as stringent a standard of disinterest as judges."69 The 
Court then noted with approval its statement in an earlier case that 
"[i]n an adversary system, [prosecutors] are necessarily permitted to 
be zealous in their enforcement of the law."70 
By introducing zealousness into its analysis, the Court blurred 
two different conceptions of prosecutorial impartiality. Up to this 
point the Court had been concerned with the threat to impartiality 
posed by a prosecutor who favors the private interest of some person 
or group.71 Such a prosecutor is "interested" in the sense that she 
favors private interests over the public interest. This concern makes 
sense in the context of the case that was before the Court, in which an 
attorney representing a private party was concurrently acting as public 
prosecutor. Zealousness, however, concerns the threat to impartiality 
posed by the prosecutor's own interests in the outcome of the case. 
This concept of zealousness is illustrated by Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc.,72 
67. Id. at 805. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 807. 
70. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 248 (1980), quoted in Vuitton, 481 U.S. at 
807. 
71. The Vuitton Court's reference to the plaintiff's interest in suppressing the counter-
feiting of their goods as a private interest leaves unmentioned the public's interest· in the 
enforcement of anti-counterfeiting laws. At the root of the Vuitton Court's concern, per-
haps, is a recognition that such private interests are not completely congruent with the 
public interest and on some occasions can be in conflict with it. See infra notes 141-45 and 
accompanying text. 
72. 446 U.S. 238 (1980). 
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the case cited by the Vuitton court to distinguish the obligations of 
judge and prosecutor. 
In Jerrico, the Court rejected a due process claim alleging that a 
government agency performing prosecutorial functions would be 
tempted to over-prosecute a statute in order to increase its share of 
the monetary penalties collected.73 Such over-prosecution would not 
have singled out any particular persons or groups, and the Jerrico 
Court explicitly noted that, had that been the case, its decision might 
have been different.74 
In Vuitton, however, the Court seemed to ignore the distinctions 
between the kinds of interests operating to influence the prosecutor 
and instead based its decision on the degree of influence: 
Ordinarily we can only speculate whether other interests are 
likely to influence an enforcement officer, and it is this specula-
tion that is informed by appreciation of the prosecutor's role. In 
a case where a prosecutor represents an interested party, how-
ever, the ethics of the legal profession require that an interest 
other than the Government's be taken into account. Given this 
inherent conflict in roles, there is no need to speculate whether 
the prosecutor will be subject to extraneous influence.75 
The private interest present in Vuitton violated the lower standard of 
disinterestedness applicable to prosecutors because "the ethics of the 
legal profession require[d]" that this interest be taken into account.76 
73. See id. at 251-52. 
74. See id. at 250 n.12. 
75. Vuitton, 481 U.S. at 807. 
76. Resolving the issue of private financing of government criminal prosecutions 
through the application of existing ethical rules would be problematic at best. Accepting 
money from a victim or any other third party raises ethical issues that require an informed 
waiver by the client. See MODEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY EC 2-21 (1982) 
("A lawyer should not accept compensation or any thing of value incident to his employ-
ment or services from one other than his client without the knowledge and consent of his 
client after full disclosure."); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.8(f) 
(1995) ("A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other 
than the client unless: (1) the client consents after consultation; (2) there is no interference 
with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relation-
ship; and (3) information relating to representation of a client is protected .... "); id. at 
Rule 5.4(c) ("A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the 
lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer's professional 
judgment in rendering such legal services."). Since the client is the State itself, however, 
the issue of obtaining a waiver is obviously problematic. Even when obtained from clients 
in ordinary criminal cases, such waivers are increasingly disfavored. See, e.g., ANNOTATED 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(f) commentary at 149 (2d ed. 1992) 
("With regard to criminal cases involving third-party payment of legal fees, courts increas-
ingly recognize that the court's interest in maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice 
system can outweigh client consent to payments by third parties."). 
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In a revealing footnote, however, the Court did distinguish be-
tween overzealousness and partiality towards some private interests: 
It is true that prosecutors may on occasion be overzealous 
and become overly committed to obtaining a conviction. That 
problem, however is personal, not structural. . . . [S]uch 
overzealousness "does not have its roots in a conflict of interest. 
When it manifests itself the courts deal with it on a case-by-case 
basis as an aberration. This is quite different from approving a 
practice which would permit the appointment of prosecutors 
whose undivided loyalty is pledged to a party interested only in 
a conviction. "77 
This discussion implies that these different threats to the impartiality 
of the prosecutor must be regulated in different ways. The threat to 
due process posed by the overzealous prosecutor overly committed to 
conviction is addressed by judicial review on a case-by-case basis. 
However, the threat to due process posed by the prosecutor commit-
ted to the interest of some private party is a "structural problem," and 
presumably cannot be handled as it arises in each case.78 
The suggestion that a prosecutor partial to a private interest con-
stitutes a structural problem is also evident in the Court's justification 
for not applying harmless-error analysis to conflict-of-interest cases. 
One of the reasons advanced by the Court for requiring per se rever-
sal in such cases was that "[a] prosecution contains a myriad of occa-
sions for the exercise of discretion, each of which goes to shape the 
record in a case, but few of which are part of the record."79 Earlier in 
its analysis the Court had described some of these "invisible" deci-
sions as follows: 
A prosecutor exercises considerable discretion in matters such 
as the determination of which persons should be targets of in-
vestigation, what methods of investigation should be used, what 
information will be sought as evidence, which persons should be 
charged with what offenses, which persons should be utilized as 
witnesses, whether to enter into plea bargains and the terms on 
which they will be established, and whether any individuals 
should be granted immunity. These decisions, critical to the con-
duct of a prosecution, are all made outside the supervision of the 
court.80 
11. Vuitton, 481 U.S. at 808 n.18 (quoting Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Stock Buyers Int'l, 
Inc., 760 F.2d 698, 705 (6th Cir. 1985)). 
78. Cf. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991) ("[S]tructural defects in the 
constitution of the trial mechanism ... defy analysis by 'harmless-error' standards."). 
19. Vuitton, 481 U.S. at 813. 
80. Id. at 807 (emphasis added). 
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A prosecutor partial to a private interest presents a "structural prob-
lem" in the sense that the structure of judicial review does not permit 
detection of signs of such influence, a limitation that precludes any 
attempt to determine whether the error permitting the conflict was 
indeed "harmless." 
In defending its decision not to apply harmless-error analysis, the 
Vuitton Court made analogies to cases where the judge or jury was 
subject to influence: "We have always been sensitive to the possibility 
that important actors in the criminal justice system may be influenced 
by factors that threaten to compromise the performance of their 
duty."81 The Court then referred to past decisions refusing to apply 
harmless-error analysis to racial discrimination in the selection of the 
grand jury and to the exposure of a petit jury to publicity unfavorable 
to the defendant.82 Implicit in this comparison is the suggestion that, 
because prosecutors, like juries, make decisions that are subject to 
limited review, great care must be taken to filter out influences that 
might taint their decisions.83 
Ironically, it is the sweeping nature of prosecutorial discretion 
that makes it impossible for a court to tell if a prosecutor is acting 
under the influence of private interests. This led the Vuitton Court to 
81. Id. at 810. 
82. See id. 
83. Analogous issues were raised-though ultimately resolved differently-in Town of 
Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987). In Rumery, the Court considered the validity of 
release-dismissal agreements where a criminal defendant releases her right to file a civil 
rights action in return for a prosecutor's dismissal of pending criminal charges. See id. at 
394. Toe Court refused to hold all such agreements invalid per se on due process grounds 
and upheld the agreement before it because the release had been voluntarily executed and 
was not adverse to the public interest. See id. In a concurring opinion that provided the 
crucial fifth vote, Justice O'Connor described the potential conflict between public and 
private interests in such cases as follows: 
[T]he availability of the release option may tempt officials to ignore their public 
duty by dropping meritorious criminal prosecutions in order to avoid the risk, 
expense, and publicity of a § 1983 suit. The public has an interest in seeing its 
laws faithfully executed. But, officials may give more weight to the private inter-
est in seeing a civil claim settled than to the public interest in seeing the guilty 
convicted. 
Id. at 400 (citation omitted); see also Cain v. Darby Borough, 7 F.3d 377 {3d Cir. 1993) 
(invalidating a release agreement on the grounds that the prosecutor made no attempt to 
show that the public interest was advanced by the release); Woods v. Rhodes, 994 F.2d 494 
(8th Cir. 1993) (upholding a release-dismissal agreement on the grounds that docket con-
trol, the costs of prosecution, and concern that dropping charges without a release would 
be misconstrued as an admission of police misconduct were legitimate interests for a prose-
cutor to consider). See gene,:ally James A. 1rowbridge, Restraining the Prosecutor: Restric-
tions on Threatening Prosecution for Civil Ends, 37 ME. L. REv. 41 {1985) (arguing that 
ethical rules should be amended to forbid prosecutors from bargaining for waivers of civil 
liability against government entities or private persons). 
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impose a blanket rule to eliminate the possibility of such influence in 
cases of criminal contempt.84 The Court implicitly recognized that, 
because the equality interests at play in prosecutorial decisionmaking 
cannot be protected by judicial review in individual cases, they must 
be protected across-the-board by preserving that aspect of the sys-
tem's structure that justifies the prosecutor's wide discretion in the 
first place-the independence of the prosecutor. While influences 
that make the prosecutor merely overzealous find some regulation in 
judicial scrutiny of a prosecutor's actions against any particular de-
fendant, the invisible damage done to equality interests by improperly 
selective prosecutions must be pre-empted by prophylactic rules that 
shield the prosecutor from influence by private interests.85 
m. Funding Sources as an Institutional Influence upon 
Government Discretion 
Private :financing raises the question of whether public officials 
such as prosecutors can be influenced by a flow of private money to 
the institutions in which they operate. The Supreme Court has not 
had to confront a case where a voluntary flow of private money into 
institutional coffers allegedly threatened prosecutorial discretion. The 
Supreme Court has, however, recognized the existence of comparable 
"institutional biases" in three of its past decisions.86 Those cases dealt 
with the impact upon judicial or prosecutorial officials of certain 
schemes for the distribution of fines or administrative penalties. Each 
case involved a claim that officials were fining as many people as pos-
sible in order to maximize revenues for their institutions.87 
84. See Vuitton, 481 U.S. at 807-09. 
85. Cf. Wright v. United States, 732 F.2d 1048, 1056 (2d Cir. 1984) ('"[T]he practical 
impossibility of establishing that the conflict [ of interest] has worked to defendant's disad-
vantage dictates the adoption of standards under which a reasonable potential for preju-
dice will suffice."') (quoting People v. Zimmer, 414 N.E2d 705, 707 (N.Y. 1980)). 
86. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 
U.S. 57 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); cf. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 
(1982) (denying due process challenge to use of private insurance carriers to administer 
Medicare claims where claims paid from federal funds); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 
(1973) (holding that administrative board of optometrists cannot hear charges filed against 
competitors). 
87. A number of lower courts have also recognized due process violations flowing 
from an institutional interest in maximizing revenues or minimizing costs to government. 
See United Church of the Med. Ctr. v. Medical Ctr. Comm'n, 689 F.2d 693 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(state statute allowed Medical Center Commission to decide which lands revert by eminent 
domain to the Commission; provisions of Medical Center Act gave the Commission finan-
cial stake in outcome of proceedings); Augustus v. Roermer, 771 F. Supp. 1458 (E.D. La. 
1991) (state statute requiring 2% bail fee payable to county coffers to support criminal 
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An ad hoc quality haunts the Supreme Court's attempts to wres-
tle with this sort of fiscal institutional bias. In each case the Court 
attempted to weigh the potential influence by looking at the amount 
of money involved. In two of the three cases, the Court actually calcu-
lated the amount of fines collected and compared that number to the 
institution's total operating budget.88 That calculation seemed to 
serve as the basis for guessing whether the amount of the fines was 
sufficient to influence the officials involved. 
Three questions can be extracted from these three opinions that 
are relevant to assessing a private financing scheme's potential influ-
ence over prosecutors. First, to what degree could the prosecutor in-
fluence the amount of money received? Second, what measure of 
dependency upon the money is likely to develop? Third, will the re-
sulting influence contribute to prosecutions against particular persons 
or groups? Applying these three questions to the various forms that 
private financing has already taken yields useful insights about both 
the nature of private financing's potential influence and how that in-
fluence might be doctrinally framed. 
A. The Fiscal Institutional Bias Cases 
In Tumey v. Ohio, 89 the Supreme Court recognized for the first 
time that government officials and their institutions can be influenced 
by the possibility of increased flows of money. The Ohio statutes chal-
lenged in Tumey provided that criminal violations of the Prohibition 
Act would be tried before the town mayor, and the local municipality 
would receive all fines collected for the violations.90 In holding that 
these statutes violated due process, the Court found that the revenues 
resulting from these fines created an "official motive to convict and to 
graduate the fine to help the financial needs of the village. "91 
judicial system); Meyer v. Niles Township, 477 F. Supp. 357 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (town supervi-
sors decided who qualified for payment from township's fund for medical injuries); Gore v. 
Emerson, 557 S.W.2d 880 (Ark. 1977) (town received majority of revenues from fines im-
posed by mayor in his judicial capacity); People v. Barboza, 627 P.2d 188 (Cal. 1981) (pub-
lic defender's office could maximize budget by not declaring conflicts of interest in cases). 
But see Baran v. Port of Beaumont Navigation Dist., 57 F.3d 436 (5th Cir. 1995) (statute 
granting ports the power to veto pilotage rates did not violate due process); People v. 
McDonnell, 434 N.E.2d 71 (III. Ct. App. 1982) (rewarding police officers who made ten 
arrests for driving while under the influence by giving them a day off with pay did not 
violate due process rights of defendants arrested). 
88. Jerrica, 446 U.S. at 245; Ward, 409 U.S. at 58. 
89. 273 U.S. 510 (1927). 
90. See id. at 516-17. 
91. Id. at 535. Under this statutory scheme, the mayor had both personal and institu-
tional interests in the result of the trial: the mayor would receive his costs in addition to his 
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Toe Court noted that the state legislature had intentionally cre-
ated this incentive, having drafted the statute "to stimulate small mu-
nicipalities ... to organize and maintain courts to try persons accused 
of violations of the Prohibition Act."92 Toe specific inducement of-
fered to these small municipalities was the money they would receive 
after "dividing between the state and the village the large fines pro-
vided by the law for its violations."93 Toward this end, the statute 
"offer[ ed] to the village council and its officers a means of substan-
tially adding to the income of the village to relieve it from further 
taxation."94 Toe Court believed that the legislature's incentive plan 
was working-the mayor had stated that he would only convene the 
court if the village needed finances and that "substantial sums" from 
the fines were used for "village improvements and repairs."95 
In finding that adjudication by the mayor violated due process in 
these circumstances, the Court repeatedly emphasized the mayor's 
role in the political structure of the village and his responsibility for 
fiscal matters. For example: 
The mayor is the chief executive of the village .... He is charged 
with the business of looking after the :finances of the village .... 
[T]he law is calculated to awaken the interest of all those in the 
village charged with the responsibility of raising the public 
money and expending it, in the pecuniarily successful conduct of 
such a court. The mayor represents the village and cannot es-
cape his representative capacity .... With his interest, as mayor, 
in the financial condition of the village, and his responsibility 
therefor, might not a defendant with reason say that he feared 
he could not get a fair trial or a fair sentence from one who 
would have so strong a motive to help his village by conviction 
and a heavy fine?96 
regular salary only for a case in which a conviction was obtained. See id. at 519. The Court 
found that these costs constituted a direct and substantial pecuniary interest in the out-
come of the case, but held that the institutional interest constituted a separate due process 
violation: "[T]he pecuniary interest of the Mayor in the result of his judgment is not the 
only reason for holding that due process of law is denied to the defendant here." Id. at 
532. 
Where officials have a personal pecuniary interest in the outcome of a decision made, 
the conflict of interest analysis is more straightforward. See, e.g., Connally v. Georgia, 429 
U.S. 245 (1977) (finding both the Fourth and the Fourteenth Amendments violated where 
judges received fees for granting search warrant requests). Private financing involves not a 
personal but an institutional interest in the monies received. 
92. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532. 
93. Id. at 532-33. 
94. Id. at 533. 
95. Id. at 521. 
96. Id. at 533. In Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928), the Court denied a due process 
challenge to a similar fine scheme where the mayor had no executive responsibilities and 
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At the heart of the due process violation found in Tumey, then, was a 
recognition that public officials can be influenced by the prospect of 
an increased flow of money into their institutions. 
Ward v. Village of Monroeville97 also involved a "mayor's court." 
In Ward, the Supreme Court actually attempted to quantify the possi-
ble influence by calculating the money involved. Noting that a major 
part of the village's income came from the fines, forfeitures, costs, and 
fees imposed by the village mayor in his judicial capacity, the Court 
compared the dollar amount of fines collected each year to the vil-
lage's total revenues for those years.98 The Court also pointed out 
that the mayor repeatedly ordered the chief of police to charge sus-
pects under village ordinances rather than state statutes whenever 
possible in order to ensure that monies collected would be paid to the 
village and not to the county.99 
Invoking Tumey, the majority in Ward held that this statutory 
scheme did not provide the neutral and detached judge required by 
due process.100 The dissent disagreed as to whether the mayor-judges 
were likely to be influenced by the amounts involved.101 The dissent 
argued that the facts did not justify the assumption "that every mayor-
judge in every case will disregard his oath and administer justice con-
trary to constitutional commands or that this will happen often 
enough to warrant the prophylactic, per se rule" adopted by the ma-
jority.102 Accordingly, the dissent argued that the due process issues 
involved should be considered on a case-by-case basis.103 
The ad hoc nature of this disagreement revealed itself in the brev-
ity of the two opinions-together they added up to only about five 
exercised only judicial functions even though the mayor's salary was affected by the 
number of convictions. 
97. 409 U.S. 57 (1972). The Ohio statute at issue authorized mayors to sit as judges in 
cases involving traffic offenses and violations of local ordinances. See id. The Court 
framed the issue as whether trial before an official who was also responsible for revenue 
production and Jaw enforcement denied the due process guarantee of a disinterested and 
impartial judicial officer. See id. at 59. The statute did not provide for any direct personal 
benefit to the mayor from a conviction. 
98. See id. at 58. For each year, the fines amounted to one third to one half of total 
village revenues. See id. 
99. See id. at 59 n.1. The Court also noted that when legislation threatened the loss of 
these funds, "the village retained a management consultant for advice." Id. at 58. 
100. See id. at 61-62. 
101. See id. at 62 (White, J., dissenting). The dissent also argued that the holding in 
Tumey should be limited to cases where the official had a direct pecuniary stake in the 
outcome of the case. See id. 
102. Id. 
103. See id. 
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pages. The Justices found themselves on terrain where it was difficult 
to make principled distinctions. Either the money was enough to 
sway someone or not, and there was simply not much more to say. 
In only one case has the Supreme Court considered whether fines 
could bias a prosecutorial agency in its exercise of discretion. Mar-
shall v. Jerrica, Inc.104 involved a statutory scheme under which mon-
ies collected as civil penalties for child labor violations were funnelled 
to the responsible agency of the Department of Labor as reimburse-
ment for the costs of enforcement. In concluding that there was no 
"realistic possibility that the assistant regional administrator's judg-
ment will be distorted by the prospect of institutional gain as a result 
of zealous enforcement efforts,"105 the Supreme Court once again 
found itself counting dollars and analyzing budgets. The penalties col-
lected amounted to less than 1 % of the agency's budget, and the 
agency had not spent its full budget appropriations during the relevant 
years.106 The unspent funds that were returned to the treasury each 
year also substantially exceeded the amount of the penalties col-
lected.107 Based on these facts, the Court concluded that the penalties 
collected had not "resulted in any increase in the funds available to 
the [agency] over the amount appropriated by Congress."108 
In Jerrica, however, the Court added a gloss to its interpretation 
of the numbers: "Unlike in Ward and Tumey, it is plain that the en-
forcing agent is in no sense financially dependent on the maintena_nce 
of a high level of penalties."109 In characterizing Ward and Tumey as 
concerning fiscal dependency upon fines, the Jerrica Court gave con-
text to its comparison of the amount of fines collected to the institu-
tion's total budget. The Court apparently reasoned that the greater 
the share of total revenues accounted for by fines, the more the 
money would be missed if the amounts assessed decreased. An offi-
cial who was counting on those revenues would presumably be influ-
enced by the prospect of their loss. 
The Jerrica Court also examined the degree to which the adminis-
trator-prosecutor could influence the level of revenues received. In 
104. 446 U.S. 238 (1980). Analogies continue to be made between the discretion af-
forded the criminal prosecutor and the discretion afforded the agency administrator prose-
cuting civil actions. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985); see also Ruth 
Colker, Administrative Prosecutorial Indiscretion, 63 TuL. L. REv. 877 (1989); Cass R. Sun-
stein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 653 (1985). 
105. Jerrico, 446 U.S. at 250. 
106. See id. 
107. See id. at 250-51. 
108. Id. at 246. 
109. Id. at 251 (emphasis added). 
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Tumey and Ward the mayor-judges sat as both judge and jury and 
could directly influence the amount of revenues received through 
their verdicts and sentences. In Jerrico, in contrast, the national office 
of the labor agency-not the regional officers making the 
prosecutorial decisions-allocated the penalties collected.11° Further-
more, the penalties had "never been allotted to the regional offices on 
the basis of the total amount of penalties collected by particular of-
fices."111 Ultimately, the Court found the potential for bias too 
contingent.112 
Finally, the Jerrico Court distinguished between prosecutorial and 
judicial officials in a way that left open the question of what standards 
would apply to an alleged influence that threatened to make a prose-
cutor not overzealous but selective.113 Referring explicitly to the wide 
discretion traditionally accorded criminal prosecutors, the Court rea-
soned that the prosecutorial nature of the Labor Administrator's func-
tion merited a more relaxed standard than that applicable to officials 
acting in a judicial capacity.114 Conceding that the Due Process 
Clause does impose some limits on "the partisanship of administrative 
prosecutors," the Court acknowledged that "[a] scheme injecting a 
personal interest, financial or otherwise, into the enforcement process 
may bring irrelevant or impermissible factors into the prosecutorial 
decision and in some contexts raise serious constitutional ques-
tions. "115 In the Jerrico footnote discussed earlier,116 the Court distin-
guished sharply between overzealousness and partiality to 
110. See id. at 246. 
111. Id. The Court also noted that in the one year in which the penalties were allocated 
to regional offices and not retained by the national office, the zealous assessment of fines 
was rewarded only indirectly in the sense that the funds were allocated on the basis of 
expenses incurred, not penalties collected. See id. at 251. 
112. See id. The Court reasoned that only under the following facts would an adminis-
trator be tempted to over-prosecute under the statute in order to obtain a higher allocation 
of penalties: the national office would have to decide to allocate the penalties to the re-
gional offices; the sums allocated would have to exceed the amount returned; the regional 
administrators would have to receive authorization to expend additional funds to increase 
enforcement; the increased effort would have to result in increased penalties; and the ad-
ministrative law judge and any reviewing courts would have to go along with the penalties. 
See id. at 252. 
113. See id. at 248-50. 
114. See id. at 250. The Court declined to apply Tumey or Ward on the grounds that the 
functions of the administrator "resemble those of a prosecutor more closely than those of a 
judge." Id. at 243. While the administrator-prosecutor was authorized to assess a civil 
penalty of up to $1,000, an assessed party was entitled to a de novo hearing before an 
administrative law judge. See id. at 244-45. · 
115. Id. at 249-50. 
116. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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prosecutions against particular persons: "In particular, we need not 
say whether different considerations might be held to apply if the al-
leged biasing influence contributed to prosecutions against particular 
persons, rather than to a general zealousness in the enforcement 
process. "117 
Thus, despite the "remoteness" and insignificance of the alleged 
influence in Jerrica, the Court reserved the question of whether an 
influence that made the prosecutor improperly selective rather than 
merely overzealous might lead to a different result. In leaving open 
the question of the improperly selective prosecutor, the Jerrica Court 
implicitly distinguished between the equality and liberty interests im-
plicated by prosecutorial decisionmaking. The Vuittan Court quoted 
this passage when it observed that influences that might make prose-
cutors improperly selective should subject them to the same standards 
of disinterestedness as judges.118 
B. Assessing the Institutional Bias of Private Financing 
The voluntary nature of private financing creates a potential for 
influence different from the fine schemes considered by the Supreme 
Court in Tumey, Ward, and Jerrica. A prosecutor is not tempted to 
favor the interests of a defendant sentenced to pay a fine because fine 
payments are involuntary.119 However, a private party making volun-
tary contributions toward criminal prosecutions might expect some-
thing in return. Therein lies a potential for influence not yet 
considered by the Supreme Court: A privately financed prosecutor 
might be tempted to favor her donors in order to justify past contribu-
tions or to attract future contributions.120 
117. Jerrico, 446 U.S. at 250 n.12. 
118. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 810 n.22 
{1976). 
119. The same distinction can be made with respect to the traditional means of financ-
ing criminal prosecutions by the government-taxes. Prosecutors are not tempted to favor 
victims by virtue of how much tax they pay because taxes are also paid involuntarily. A 
taxpayer who does not like a prosecutor's decisions still has to pay her taxes. 
120. The public finance literature analyzing the impact of user fees upon government 
bureaucracies describes exactly this type of influence. For example: 
[A] user-charge program may improve operating efficiency because agency staff 
must respond to client demand. Agencies usually operate with funds obtained 
from and justified to a legislative body. That justification will elaborate needs as 
estimated by the agency staff and will be defended according to performance cri-
teria established by the agency staff. User-charge finance, however, requires a 
shift to preferences articulated directly by customers. The agency must provide 
services that are desired by consumers, or it will fail the financial test for survival. 
It cannot define what clients should want in its budget defense; it must provide 
the services clients actually will purchase. 
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Such favoritism was envisioned by the trial judge in People v. Eu-
banks,121 the Silicon Valley case described earlier.122 The judge ques-
tioned the prosecutor for allowing the victim corporation to pay over 
$13,000 for independent expert investigation costs: 
Doesn't that put the District Attorney in a position, as a human 
being, to feel a greater obligation for this particular victim than 
some other fellow or person who doesn't offer to pay existing 
debts? ... [L]et's assume that the District Attorney's office, in 
the review of their case ultimately conclude that, 'Well, you 
know, maybe our case isn't as strong as we thought at the incep-
tion.' Would it be easier for them to tell a victim who paid no 
money to the D.A.'s office, 'You don't have a case,' than it 
would be for one that you received $15,000 from?123 
The judge's questions suggest that a privately financed case that might 
otherwise have been dismissed on its merits could be pressed to trial 
out of a sense of obligation to the contributing victim and that a pri-
vately financed victim might receive greater consideration than a 
"nonpaying customer. "124 
Since private financing involves an influence that could poten-
tially affect prosecutions against particular persons-those targeted by 
the contributor-rather than a general overzealousness in the enforce-
ment process, Jerrico, Ward, and Tumey yield no insight about what 
degree of potential influence, if any, the Supreme Court might tolerate 
in this context. However, the Jerrico Court's concern with fiscal de-
pendency and the prosecutor's influence over the amount of money 
received do provide two interesting lines of inquiry. 
The potential for a prosecutor to become dependent upon private 
financing depends to some degree upon how the private money is put 
MIKESELL, supra note 15, at 425; see also B. GUY PETERS, THE PoLmcs OF BUREAU· 
CRACY 131-32, 155,262 (1989) (describing the influence of pressure groups over bureaucra-
cies through budgetary politics). To some degree, those who would argue that private 
financing would make criminal prosecution more efficient assume that prosecutors would 
be so influenced. 
121. 927 P.2d 310 (Cal. 1996). 
122. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
123. Brief for Respondents, People v. Eubanks, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846 (Ct. App. 1995) 
(quoting Record at 4561, 4563). The California Supreme Court agreed: "No reason is ap-
parent why a public prosecutor's impartiality could not be impaired by institutional inter-
ests, as by personal ones." People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 319-20 (Cal. 1996). 
124. See MODEL CooE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmILITY EC 5-22 (1982) ("Economic, 
political, or social pressures by third persons are less likely to impinge upon the independ-
ent judgment of a lawyer in a matter in which he is compensated directly by his client and 
his professional work is exclusively with his client. On the other hand, if a lawyer is com-
pensated from a source other than his client, he may feel a sense of responsibility to some-
one other than his client."). 
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to use. Eubanks, for example, involved payment of some of the inves-
tigation costs, 125 an expense constituting a variable cost in the sense 
that it arises only if the investigation is continued. Other schemes for 
private :financing involve payment of salaries, an expense that is fixed 
in the sense that the salaries must be paid regardless of whether any 
particular case is prosecuted. In California's Ventura County, for ex-
ample, proceeds from the workers' compensation fraud prosecution 
fund established by local business contributions were to be used to 
pay the salary of the assistant district attorney responsible for prose-
cuting those cases.126 
An institution that depends on voluntary contributions to pay the 
salary of any of its personnel is dependent upon those contributions in 
an important way, given that most bureaucracies struggle to avoid 
having to eliminate positions. The potential for influence on the indi-
vidual level is even stronger. For example, a prosecutor whose salary 
is paid out of business contributions to a fund for a certain category of 
white collar crime might fear that her salary would not be forthcoming 
for the next fiscal year if her prosecutorial decisions did not satisfy her 
contributors.127 
Even private financing only of variable costs-such as the expert 
investigator costs in Eubanks-could engender such a dependency. A 
prosecutor assigned to complex fraud cases who relied on voluntary 
contributions from insurance companies to pay for special investiga-
tive costs necessary for the successful prosecution of those cases might 
feel vulnerable to pressure from those contributors. Fiscal depen-
dency, moreover, is not the only type of dependency that might moti-
vate the decisions of prosecutors. Prosecutors who accept private 
:financing of variable costs in white collar cases might feel that their 
credibility in the relevant business community depends on their ability 
125. See 927 P.2d at 312-14. What particularly concerned the California Supreme Court 
was that most of the private funds were used to reimburse the district attorney for expenses 
that had already been incurred. See id. at 321. 
126. See McDonald, supra note 7, at Bl. 
127. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-23 (1982) ("A person or or-
ganization that pays or furnishes lawyers to represent others possesses a potential power to 
exert strong pressures against the independent judgment of those lawyers. Some employ-
ers may be interested in furthering their own economic, political, or social goals without 
regard to the professional responsibility of the lawyer to his individual client. ... [A]n 
employer may seek, consciously or unconsciously, to further its own economic interests 
through the action of the lawyers employed by it."). 
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to justify the investments made by obtaining the results desired by 
their contributors.128 
Assessing the prosecutor's ability to influence the level of contri-
butions to be received is complicated. Like the administrator-prose-
cutor in Jerrica, and unlike the mayor-judges in Tumey and Ward, the 
prosecutor cannot directly set the amount of money to be received via 
the typical private financing scheme. The ability of prosecutors to 
maintain or increase the amount of private financing that is forthcom-
ing depends in part upon the degree to which they can serve the inter-
ests of contributors. For instance, in the private financing in Eubanks, 
the donor contributed only to the prosecution of the case in which the 
donor was the victim.129 Given the high level of interest the donor-
victim had in his own case, the prosecutor could directly serve the 
donor's interests by an aggressive and successful prosecution of that 
particular case.130 Serving such a contributor successfully might in-
crease the chances that future contributions from other similarly situ-
ated victims would be forthcoming. 
In the Ventura County example, however, business interests con-
tribute to a fund to be used to prosecute an entire category of crime. 
Because the funds of various contributors are commingled together, 
the relationship of the donors individually, or even as a group, to any 
particular case is less direct. On the other hand, the possibility that a 
prosecutor might come to depend upon the continued flow of those 
funds is arguably much greater since they finance an entire category of 
criminal behavior on an ongoing basis.131 
128. See MoDEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmILITY EC 5-21 (1982) ("The obli-
gation of a lawyer to exercise professional judgment solely on behalf of his client requires 
that he disregard the desires of others that might impair his free judgment. The desires of a 
third person will seldom adversely affect a lawyer unless that person is in a position to 
exert strong economic, political, or social pressures upon the lawyer. These influences are 
often subtle, and a lawyer must be alert to their existence.") (footnote omitted). 
129. See generally 927 P.2d 310. 
130. The California Supreme Court recognized the potential for improper influence in 
such a situation: "[A] prosecutor may have a conflict if institutional arrangements link the 
prosecutor too closely to a private party, for example a victim, who in turn has a personal 
interest in the defendant's prosecution and conviction." Id. at 320. 
131. A practice closely related to voluntary private financing by business interests is the 
use of dedicated taxes or assessments to finance certain types of business-related prosecu-
tions. In Pennsylvania, insurance companies are assessed fees based on their volume of 
business in the state, and the proceeds are placed in a fund that is disbursed to prosecutors 
for use in insurance fraud prosecutions. See 40 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 3701-303(c) (1996). 
Given the mandatory nature of the "contributions" to the fund, prosecutors are not subject 
to the same degree of pressure to satisfy the insurance companies funding their activities. 
While representatives of the insurance companies have seats on the commission that deter-
mines how the funds are distributed among prosecutorial agencies, see 40 PA. CoNs. STAT. 
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Ironically, the example of private financing that arguably involves 
the lowest potential for influence is also the least typical. In the Susan 
Smith case,132 the individuals who mailed in contributions to fund the 
capital prosecution of Smith presumably had no direct interest in the 
outcome of the case beyond a general desire for justice or vengeance. 
There was also little prospect of the prosecutor receiving future con-
tributions given the unusual circumstances that led to nationwide in-
terest in the case in the first place. Even so, the South Carolina 
Attorney General's opinion authorizing the county to accept the con-
tributions stipulated that the county prosecutor needed to state clearly 
that by accepting the money he was not agreeing to exercise his 
prosecutorial discretion in any particular way.133 Further, contribu-
tions made expressly on the condition that the death penalty be 
sought had to be returned.134 
To the degree that a scheme for private financing of government 
prosecutions creates a flow of money that can influence the prosecu-
tor to favor the contributor's interests and upon which the prosecutor 
might grow dependent, private financing itself creates the type of fis-
cal institutional influence that the Supreme Court foresaw in Tumey, 
Ward, and Jerrica. Because that influence threatens to make the pros-
ecutor partial to discrete private interests and not merely overzealous 
in the prosecution of all crime, the fiscal institutional bias cases pro-
vide no guidance as to whether the mere possibility of such influence 
should trigger the across-the-board prohibition applied in Vuitton, or 
whether some potential bias should be tolerated. Ultimately, that 
question turns upon the importance attached to the equality interests 
threatened by the private financing of government prosecutors.135 
§ 3701-301(B) (1996), the amount of money available to be disbursed is a function solely of 
the volume of insurance business transacted in the state. 
132. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
133. See Letter from Charles Molony Condon, Att'y Gen. of South Carolina, to Robert 
E. Guess, Union County Attorney, S.C. (Jan. 25, 1995), available in 1995 WL 67626. 
134. See id. The Union County prosecutor did unsuccessfully seek the death penalty 
against Smith, but all of the contributions had already been returned. The blessing of the 
South Carolina Attorney General notwithstanding, some county officials were reportedly 
repulsed by the donors' calls for Smith's execution. See Donations to Aid Smith Prosecu-
tion to Be Returned, Herald (Rock Hill, S.C.), Feb. 1, 1995, at 6A ("We can't guarantee 
anybody's death."). 
135. An interesting analogy can be drawn between the incentives created by private 
financing of criminal prosecutions and the incentives created when a law enforcement 
agency receives funds from civil forfeitures in criminal cases. In both cases, a mechanism 
exists by which officials can increase the revenues at their institution's disposal. This as-
pect of civil forfeiture in criminal cases has drawn much criticism. See, e.g., Michael F. 
Alessio, From Exodus to Embarrassment: Civil Forfeiture Under the Drug Abuse Preven-
tion and Control Act, 48 SMU L. REv. 429 (1995); David P. Atkins & Adele V. Patterson, 
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IV. Efficiency, Legitimacy, and the Tension Between Public 
and Private Interests 
Private financing focuses attention on an unappreciated aspect of 
the status quo-the degree to which financing government prosecu-
tions through taxes reserves control over the prosecutor's vast powers 
to the government. Financing government prosecutions through vol-
untary private contributions inevitably surrenders a measure of that 
control to the contributors in a way that may affect how the benefits 
and the punishments of the criminal justice system are distributed. 
Attempts to justify this surrender on the grounds of economic effi-
ciency136 and victims' rights137 are foreseeable, but private financing 
serves those interests selectively, at best, and at the expense of 
equality. 
Society's interest in the equal treatment of all victims and all de-
fendants has always been submerged beneath the independence of the 
government prosecutor. In undermining that independence, private 
financing clarifies what society has at stake in the equality of the pros-
ecutor's choices. Exploring these equality interests systematically is 
beyond the scope of this Article, but this Part argues that equality in 
areas of discretionary decisionmaking is ultimately a question of legiti-
macy and of control over government power. 
Punishment or Compensation? New Constitutional Restrictions on Civil Forfeiture, 11 U. 
BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 371 (1991); Mary M. Cheh, Can Something This Easy, Quick, and 
Profitable Also Be Fair? Runaway Civil Forfeiture Stumbles on the Constitution, 39 N.Y.L. 
SCH. L. REv. 1 (1994); Terrence G. Reed, On the Importance of Being Civil· Constitutional 
Limitations on Civil Forfeiture, 39 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 255 (1994). For an economic analy-
sis of such forfeiture schemes, see Catherine Cerna, Note, Economic Theory Applied to 
Civil Forfeiture: Efficiency and Deterrence Through Reallocation of External Costs, 46 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 1939 (1995). 
The incentives for misconduct created by civil forfeiture could be eliminated if the 
proceeds from the forfeiture were not retained by the law enforcement agencies involved. 
While raising revenue by seizing ill-gotten gains is a worthy goal, it does not necessarily 
follow that law enforcement must keep the proceeds. "Civil forfeiture ... operates as a 
tax, in that revenue arises from application of the system of laws. Police agencies have no 
more special right to these proceeds than does the IRS have a special claim to its ... tax 
collections." MIKESELL, supra note 15, at 427. Unlike civil forfeiture, however, private 
financing involves voluntary contributions that would probably not be forthcoming unless 
applied to prosecutions in which the contributors had an interest. 
136. See, e.g., PETER SELF, GOVERNMENT BY THE MARKET? (1993) (defining public 
choice theories of politics as arguing that government should be remodeled and trans-
formed according to market concepts of competition and efficiency). 
137. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Unstated Assumptions of Efficiency 
By coaxing additional dollars from the private sector, private fi-
nancing increases the resources available for prosecuting crime with-
out any increase in public spending. Private financing thus seems 
efficient in the sense that society can prosecute more crime with the 
same investment of public dollars.138 Private financing of criminal 
prosecutions will not, however, increase the total capacity of the crim-
inal justice system; it will merely change the mix of cases prosecuted. 
Privately financing one part of a publicly financed criminal justice 
system would inevitably divert an additional share of public resources 
toward the privately financed cases. Providing private dollars for 
prosecutors in insurance fraud cases, for example, while not providing 
private money for more courtrooms, judges, and public defenders for 
those cases would mean that, ultimately, more public dollars would 
have to be spent on insurance fraud cases than would otherwise have 
been spent in order to keep pace with the increase in prosecutions. 
Given the general lack of excess capacity in the criminal justice sys-
tem, a "systemic inflation" of sorts would result from a greater 
number of cases chasing a fixed number of courtrooms. Ultimately, 
the only way to avoid this effect would be for the contributor to fi-
nance all costs of the criminal justice system. This, however, is an un-
likely prospect.139 
Diversion of public resources would be even greater if only varia-
ble prosecution costs (such as expert witness fees) were financed. 
Given the limited number of prosecutors available, privately financed 
and publicly financed cases would compete for their time and atten-
tion. Since such fixed costs of the prosecutor's office would continue 
to be publicly financed, private financing of only the prosecution's va-
riable costs would lead to an even greater public investment in the 
privately financed cases. They would be more likely to be prosecuted 
because of the greater resources available for them.140 
138. For a comprehensive economic analysis of "user fees" by government in other con-
texts, see Clayton P. Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal and Eco-
nomic Analysis, 67 B.U. L. REv. 795 (1987). 
139. To the extent that privately financed cases would be brought against the indigent, 
more is at stake than merely increasing the congestion of the criminal justice system. If 
private funds are available for providing expert witnesses for the prosecution in certain 
types of cases but not for the defense, for example, either the public will have to spend 
more on indigent criminal defense or the relative quality of indigent criminal defense will 
be compromised. 
140. This unseen diversion of public dollars is a common problem with user fees or 
charges for government services in general. Sometimes fiscal problems are exacerbated as 
a result: "During periods of tight finances decision makers are tempted to expand reve-
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Given the lack of excess capacity in both prosecutors' offices and 
the criminal justice system in general, a privately :financed case would 
inevitably involve an opportunity cost for society. Each privately fi-
nanced criminal case would displace a publicly :financed prosecution 
to some extent. To be sure, it is possible that the displaced case might 
not have served the public interest as well as the privately :financed 
case. On the other hand, the fact that some group in society is willing 
to privately finance a case does not necessarily mean its prosecution 
would advance society's interest more than would prosecution of the 
displaced publicly :financed case. The existence of an individual or 
group willing to finance the prosecution of a crime or category of 
crimes simply means that such a group believes prosecution of that 
crime is in its interest. The absence of willing :financiers might reflect 
that the costs of a privately "un:financed" crime are diffused through-
out society and not concentrated in any one individual or group with 
money to spend.141 
A prosecutorial choice is truly "efficient" to the degree that it 
yields the greatest social good for the least investment of resources. 
Private :financing is only "efficient" if one assumes that the financing 
would flow toward those problems affecting society most profoundly. 
Presumably, private :financing will always be efficient from the con-
tributors' point of view because their interests will be served by the 
diversion of public resources toward prosecutorial attention to the 
crimes that concern them most.142 
nue-generating activities, often reasoning that any revenue will help with the fiscal prob-
lem. Unfortunately, such expansion can actually increase the total subsidy required for 
that service and worsen the overall budget condition." MIKESELL, supra note 15, at 424. 
141. For this reason, private financing is unlikely to serve as a panacea for the problem 
of white-collar crime. "Many white-collar crimes tend to be diffuse in their victimization-
affecting a large number of victims with injuries ranging from trivial to great." Kip Schle-
gel & David Weisburd, White-Collar Crime: The Parallax View, in WHITE CoLLAR CRIME 
RECONSIDERED, supra note 32, at 3, 11. An environmental crime, for example, could po-
tentially affect an entire community, but the perceived interest of any one individual in 
prosecuting the offender would probably be too slight to elicit a contribution. 
Private financing would probably also not be forthcoming where an "identifiable vic-
tim" does not exist, as would be the case in many environmental crimes. 
[T]he temporal feature of many white-collar crimes both masks and complicates 
the victimization. It masks the victimization because the injuries often occur 
much later than the actual act. It complicates victimizations because the crimes 
are often not singular or isolated acts, but part of a sequential chain of events 
leading to detectable injury. 
Id. at 11-12. 
142. Discriminating between activities that bring in some form of revenue and those 
that do not is a common phenomenon: 
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B. Public Good, Private Good, and the Interests of the Victim 
In an important sense, society's interest is served anytime a viola-
tion of its criminal laws is prosecuted. Arguably, all criminal prosecu-
tions serve society by deterring others from violating the law. Thus, 
law enforcement has been described as a "public good" in that society 
benefits from having it and suffers from its absence.143 Fire protection 
is an example of a public good. When a house fire is extinguished, the 
greater community benefits because the fire might have spread. Simi-
larly, the benefits resulting from enforcement of criminal laws is un-
derstood to extend beyond the parties affected by any particular 
crime. A violator jailed through a privately :financed prosecution 
would be unable to commit further crime against others. Crime that 
goes unpunished may also spread, like fire. 
Thinking of criminal prosecution solely as a public good, how-
ever, fails to recognize the substantial benefit that a successful prose-
cution can confer on private parties. Sometimes, this benefit dwarfs 
society's more general interest in the prosecution of crime. People v. 
Eubanks144 illustrates this contention. The victim corporation there 
was also the plaintiff in a parallel civil suit against the same defend-
ants.145 Victory in the criminal case would greatly assist victory in the 
civil case.146 
The ability to charge for particular services can distort agency decision making. 
Thus, a high school football team receives magnanimous resources because gate 
receipts are sizable, whereas the girls' volleyball team gets hand-me-downs. The 
g_uestion for resource allocation is contribution to the purposes of the community 
(or social benefits); simple cash flow should not be the determining factor in such 
an instance. 
MIKESELL, supra note 15, at 425. 
143. See id. at 2-5; see also Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 25 (1980) ("'[T]he 
purpose of a criminal court is not to provide a forum for the ascertainment of private 
rights. Rather it is to vindicate the public interest in the enforcement of the criminal law 
while at the same time safeguarding the rights of the individual defendant."') (quoting 
United States v. Standefer, 610 F.2d 1076, 1093 (3rd Cir. 1979)); STANDARDS FOR C!uMI-
NAL JUSTICE Standard 3-2.1 cmt. (1979) ("The idea that the criminal law, unlike other 
branches of the law such as contracts and property, is designed to vindicate public rather 
than private interests is now firmly established."). 
144. 927 P.2d 310 (Cal. 1996). 
145. See id. at 324. 
146. Even if a conviction were not obtained, the victim would still enjoy substantial 
benefits: the defendant's legal strategy would probably have been revealed in the criminal 
case, the victim corporation would undoubtedly benefit from some "free discovery," and 
the defendant's resources for legal defense would be somewhat diminished. See generally 
Gabriel L. Gonzalez et al., Parallel Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 30 AM. CruM. L. REv. 
1179 (1993). 
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Such a benefit could be seen as coming within the victim's legiti-
mate interest in restitution for the crime committed against him.147 
While the victim's restitutionary interest in a criminal case certainly 
does not conflict with society's interest in prosecuting a case, neither 
are the two interests congruent. A victim can benefit more from a 
prosecution than society in general, just as the resident whose kitchen 
fire is extinguished by the fire department before it consumes his en-
tire house benefits more than someone who lives on the opposite side 
of town.148 
Many of the benefits flowing to a victim from a criminal prosecu-
tion may still obtain even if the accused is not guilty of the crime. In 
such situations the interests of society and those of the victim diverge. 
The defendant corporation in Eubanks, for example, was a competitor 
of the victim corporation, and facing criminal prosecution for intellec-
tual property theft probably compromised the defendant's ability to 
compete against the victim to some extent.149 Distracting the com-
pany's top management, chilling the company's relations with custom-
ers and suppliers, pushing down the price of the company's stock-all 
of these problems are arguably more serious for a company that is 
indicted by the government for criminal violations than for a company 
merely sued by a competitor in a civil action.150 The "victim" corpora-
147. Some scholars have developed theories of crime that give the victim's interest in 
restitution a central role. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNEIT, ASSESSING THE CRIMINAL: REsTI-
nmoN, RETRmunoN, AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 349, 363 (1977); Randy E. Barnett, The 
Justice of Restitution, 25 AM. J. Jurus. 117 (1980). 
148. The existence of a victim who is willing and able to pursue a civil remedy has been 
used as a justification for nonprosecution by the Assistant Attorney General in charge of 
Antitrust for the Reagan Administration: 
When private parties suffer substantial injury, their incentives to seek redress are 
high, particularly in light of the availability of treble damages and attorneys' fees. 
In such cases there is little reason for the government to prosecute and spend 
resources that could otherwise be used against more systematic violations for 
which no private plaintiff is likely to sue or for which criminal sanctions are 
desirable. 
William F. Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Common Law" 
Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 'Tux. L. REv. 661, 691 (1982). 
149. Chief Judge George expressed this concern in his concurring opinion. See Eu-
banks, 927 P.2d at 323-25. 
150. Of course, it would be unethical for either a private lawyer or a public prosecutor 
to press a criminal case to obtain a civil advantage. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL 
REsPONSIBILITY DR 7-105(A) (1982) ("A lawyer shall not present, participate in present-
ing, or threaten to present criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil mat-
ter."); see also AMERICAN BAR FOUND., ANNOTATED CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL 
REsPONSIBILITY 343 (1979) ("The criminal process, which is designed to protect society as 
a whole, is undermined when it is used to force settlement of private claims or controvcr-
. ") s1es . . . . . 
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tion enjoys the benefits flowing from the accusation against its com-
petitor regardless of whether its competitor is guilty. To the degree 
that the mere filing of a criminal accusation by the government against 
an innocent party is enough to confer substantial benefits on a victim, 
the victim's interests in seeing the prosecution pressed can directly 
conflict with society's interest in prosecuting only the guilty.151 
Financing entire categories of crime through funds established by 
the businesses affected involves similar disparities between the public 
and private interests. While all of society benefits from the prosecu-
tion of workers' compensation fraud-especially when the costs of 
this crime are shifted to consumers through higher prices-the compa-
nies directly affected by the fraud arguably benefit more.152 A com-
pany that does not have to pay a fraudulent claim enjoys a direct 
benefit, and other companies similarly situated receive a deterrence 
benefit that is greater than society's more general interest in the deter-
rence of crime. Successful prosecution of workers' compensation 
fraud deters such fraud against local businesses more than it deters 
crime generally. 
A potential conflict between society's interest and the victim's in-
terest also exists in this context. The people have an interest in seeing 
only fraudulent workers' compensation claims deterred, but to the ex-
tent that legitimate claims are also chilled because of a perceived alli-
ance between business and the district attorney's office, the 
contributing businesses derive an additional benefit from not having 
to pay these claims.153 
To the degree that an individual or group in society benefits dis-
proportionately from the prosecution of certain crimes, and to the de-
gree that those individuals or groups have money to spare, those 
crimes may be likely candidates for private financing. The willingness 
of monied interests to finance certain prosecutions does not necessar-
ily mean that those crimes are in society's interest to prosecute. That 
determination requires a comparison of the social benefit of the pri-
151. Cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 596 (1980) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (stating that the public interest is harmed if an innocent person is convicted). 
152. Even if a company shifted 100% of the cost of such crimes to consumers through 
pricing, the company would still suffer because the increase in price would decrease reve-
nues unless the demand for the company's services did not decrease. 
153. Other types of potential conflict between victims' and society's interests in the 
prosecution of a crime exist. For example, a victim might want to accept an offer of restitu-
tion in exchange for dismissal of the charge, whereas society's interest might be better 
served by prosecution of the offender. This scenario is not uncommon in many white collar 
crimes. See, e.g., Paul Jesilow et al., Reporting Consumer and Major Fraud, in WHITE COL-
LAR CRIME RECONSIDERED, supra note 32, at 149, 166-67. 
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vately financed prosection to the social benefit that would have re-
sulted from the publicly financed cases that would have been 
prosecuted but were not. This, again, is a measure of the cost to soci-
ety of lost opportunity, something to which the existence of a willing 
group of private financiers does not speak.154 
C. Legitimacy as the Substance of Equality in Matters of Discretion 
Ultimately, society's best answer to the question of what 
prosecutorial choices will result in the greatest good for the greatest 
number is a process, a process that is considered legitimate in part 
because it denies everyone equally a direct influence over the prose-
cutor's decisions.155 In the absence of any objective and widely ac-
cepted standard for determining whether prosecuting insurance fraud 
or environmental crime best serves society's interest, for example, the 
legitimacy of that process serves as the very substance of equality. 
This relationship between the inherently discretionary nature of 
the prosecutor's decisionmaking and the need for legitimacy was cap-
tured by the Supreme Court in its analogy in Young v. United States ex 
rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A. 156 between prosecutors and juries.157 Decision-
making by prosecutors and juries is to some degree a "black box" pro-
cess. Just as outsiders are not permitted to observe the deliberations 
of the jury, scrutiny of the prosecutor's deliberative processes is dis-
couraged. In both cases, the scope of review of the decisions made is 
strictly circumscribed. Finally, both juries and prosecutors make deci-
sions that are inherently discretionary in the sense that they are not 
reducible to any sort of formula or meaningful standard.158 Given the 
absence of any standard for judging the validity of the decision 
reached, the legitimacy of the decisionmaking process is all that 
remains. 
154. Peter Self has argued that public choice arguments ultimately deny the meaning of 
the concepts of "public good" and "public interest" See SELF, supra note 136, at 232-36. 
He accuses public choice advocates of wanting to fragment the concept of a public interest 
by "establishing more direct linkages between personal interests and public policy." Id. at 
236. He argues for a return to a more positive concept of active citizenship based on a 
wider range of social values in place of the "consumer democracy" that public choice of-
fers. Id. 
155. For a procedural model of equal protection analysis that describes legitimacy pri-
marily in terms of equal representation of all interests in governmental decisionmaking, 
see generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980). 
156. 481 U.S. 787 (1987). 
157. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. 
158. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text. 
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As in all questions of legitimacy, much depends upon appear-
ances.159 To the degree that prosecutors who take private money will 
be seen as beholden to the contributors, the legitimacy of the 
prosecutorial decisionmaking process suffers, as will the legitimacy of 
the entire criminal justice process, given the central role played by 
prosecutorial discretion. 
The legitimacy of the prosecutor's decisionmaking process has 
been recognized as inextricably linked to the polity's willingness to 
accept the authority of government.160 A criminal prosecution by the 
government both confers legitimacy upon a private complaint and de-
pends upon legitimacy for its acceptance. The authority of govern-
ment prosecutions may be diminished if they are perceived as being 
exercised disproportionately on behalf of the wealthy.161 
D. Preferential Access to Justice as a Threat to Equality 
Detennining to what degree prosecution of a crime advances the 
public interest has traditionally been entrusted to the prosecutor's sole 
discretion. To the degree that private :financing enables the prosecu-
tor to select from a broader menu of cases to prosecute by adding to 
the resources at her command, it offers a benefit. To the degree that 
private :financing compromises the prosecutor's ability to place the 
public interest above the interests of her contributors, it exacts a cost. 
The prosecutor's own interest in maximizing the resources subject to 
159. See Vuitton, 481 U.S. at 811 ("[A]n interested prosecutor creates an appearance of 
impropriety that diminishes faith in the fairness of the criminal justice system in general."). 
160. See Vuitton, 481 U.S. at 811 (warning that misuse of special powers of the prosecu-
tor "'impair[s] public willingness to accept the legitimate use of those powers"') (quoting 
WOLFRAM, supra note 20, § 8.10.2 at 460). 
161. Under Madisonian constitutionalism, the legitimacy of government depends on 
limiting the influence of such factions. Madison defined "faction" as any group "united 
and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of 
other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." THE FED· 
ERALIST No. 10, at 57 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Faction has been 
interpreted by some scholars in terms of divisions in wealth. See, e.g., CHARLES A. BEARD, 
AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CoNSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 14-15, 
153-54 {1941) (citing unequal distribution of property as primary concern); DAVID A.J. 
RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONALISM 39 {1989) {defining faction 
as encompassing religious, economic and political divisions). 
For Madisonians, the capture of government power by private interests destroys the 
legitimacy of government power. "Factionalized ends ... were illegitimate ends. They 
could not be justified in terms of the deeper value of equality that is fundamental to consti-
tutional government, namely that political power must be reasonably justifiable to all per-
sons as respecting their rights and serving the common interests of all." RICHARDS, supra, 
at 258. Consequently, the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection is seen 
as an articulation of "the underlying moral ideal of the equality of all persons" upon which 
the Constitution is based. Id. 
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her control could conflict with society's interest in the equal consider-
ation of each case. This equality interest concerns the fair or optimal 
allocation of the prosecutor's resources. 
Even if one assumes that private financing would add to the 
number of crimes prosecuted without detracting from the opportuni-
ties of nonpaying victims to secure redress, or if one assumed that the 
prosecutor would only accept the financing when it was in the public 
interest and not merely in her institutional interest to do so, private 
financing would still threaten a distinct equality interest that is not 
related to the fair allocation of scarce resources: Privately financed 
victims will enjoy preferential access to justice. Even if private financ-
ing does not diminish the access to justice for others, the privately 
financed victim would still enjoy superior access to justice by virtue of 
her wealth. A two-tier system of criminal justice would develop in 
which privately financed cases would enjoy the best experts and serv-
ices while publicly financed cases would be left to compete for their 
share of limited public funds. A rich victim might get a better prose-
cution than a poor victim. This threat to equality makes no assump-
tions about influence or trade-offs between cases.162 
162. This prospect clearly concerned the California Supreme Court in Eubanks: "A sys-
tem in which affluent victims, including prosperous corporations, were assured of prompt 
attention from the district attorney's office, while crimes against the poor went unprose-
cuted, would neither deserve nor receive the confidence of the public." 927 P.2d at 318 
(footnote omitted). The dangers of a two-tier system of criminal prosecution are a subset 
of a larger problem involving the privatization of services traditionally provided by the 
government. In the words of Robert Reich, "the fortunate fifth is quietly seceding from 
the rest of the nation." EVAN McKENZIE, PRlvATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND 
nm RISE OF REsIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 175 (1994) (quoting Secretary of Labor 
Robert Reich). As more and more government services are "privatized," some fear that 
monied interests in society will seek to withdraw from public institutions: "I am trying to 
envision what happens when 10 or 20 per cent of the population has enough income to 
bypass the social institutions it doesn't like in ways that only the top fraction of 1 per cent 
used to be able to do." Id. at 175 (quoting Charles Murray). 
A danger exists that those who can privately finance "pet prosecutions" may grow less 
willing to pay taxes to support public prosecutions generally. Evan McKenzie described 
exactly this phenomenon in the context of common-interest-housing developments 
("CIDs"): 
Advocates of CIDS have long contended that the assessments residents pay to 
their associations are the equivalent of property taxes .... They contend that if 
they are paying for their own trash removal, for maintenance of their own streets, 
and for upkeep on their own park, they should not have to pay property tax as-
sessments for such services .... The solution, from their perspective, would be to 
permit CID residents to deduct some or all of their assessments from their prop-
erty tax bill. In areas with large numbers of CIDS, this could amount to a serious 
loss of local government revenues. 
Id. at 165. In the CID context, what began as a voluntary effort by private associations to 
provide additional services for themselves has resulted in pressures to withdraw their tax 
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Preferential access to justice for monied interests also threatens 
the defendant's distinct interest in equality. To the degree that the 
quality of the prosecution a defendant faced might depend on the 
wealth of the person accusing her, a different sort of inequality ob-
tains. Arguably, no defendant has a right to a fiscally strapped prose-
cutor, but the prospect of defendants facing disproportionate 
prosecution by the government based on the wealth of their accusers 
is troubling.163 The powers wielded by government are considerable, 
as is the cost of merely being accused by the government of criminal 
conduct. To the degree that the wealthy would enjoy a superior ability 
to unleash these forces on those who offend their interests, inequali-
ties in political power that already exist as a function of wealth would 
be exacerbated.164 
Ultimately, private financing forces a choice between competing 
goods. To the extent that private financing might allow prosecution of 
certain crimes that are foregone solely because of cost, society's inter-
ests in punishing the guilty are advanced. To the extent that these 
additional prosecutions are the product of preferential access to jus-
tice for monied interests, society's interests in the equal treatment of 
all victims and of all defendants suffer. Private financing inevitably 
pits these two interests against one another. 
dollars from public institutions responsible for those same services. Conceivably, private 
financing of criminal prosecutions could result in pressure for a similar withdrawal. 
163. Cf. Vuitton, 481 U.S. at 811 ("If a prosecutor uses the expansive prosecutorial pow-
ers to gather information for private purposes, the prosecution function has been seriously 
abused even if, in the process, sufficient evidence is obtained to convict a defendant."). 
164. For a thoughtful polemic arguing that the disproportionate influence of monied 
interests over government is society's most serious problem, see RICHARD N. Gooowrn, 
PROMISES TO KEEP 13 (1992) ("To a significant extent, private power has subordinated the 
structures of representative democracy to the service of its own interests .... Our welfare 
.•. has been damaged by a profane combination of private interests with public authority 
") . . . . . 

